

the christian SCHOLAR



the crisis of vocation / Carl Michelson
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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

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The Christian Scholar

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Editor's Preface	87
THE CRISIS OF VOCATION	<i>Carl Michalson</i> 89
"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION	<i>Richard N. Bender</i> 101
SEGREGATED FRATERNITIES IN OUR COLLEGES	<i>Joseph M. Hopkins</i> 109
RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY	<i>Alburey Castell</i> 114
THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY	<i>F. David Martin</i> 125
MARKS OF AN EDUCATED MAN	<i>Kermit Eby</i> 134
SOME SHOULD BE * * * TEACHERS	<i>William R. Mueller</i> 138
CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION	<i>Nels F. S. Ferré</i> 142
THE INARTICULATE ROOTS OF FREE VALUES	<i>Peter Viereck</i> 159
SCIENCE AND RELIGION	<i>John Garhart</i> 163
BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS	167
REPORTS AND NOTICES	179

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

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Both *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR* and the *Faculty Christian Fellowship* are departments of the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches. The purpose of the Commission is to develop basic philosophy and requisite programs within its assigned field, to awaken the entire public to the conviction that religion is essential to a complete education and that education is necessary in the achievement of progress, to foster a vital Christian life in college and university communities of the U. S. A., to strengthen the Christian college, to promote religious instruction therein, and to emphasize the permanent necessity of higher education under distinctly Christian auspices.

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The Editor's Preface

"The universities today have not only a *mission* but a task in the contemporary world." This important distinction, recently made by a wise educator in a conversation concerning higher education in a world so much of which is caught up in rapid social development, seems to be of striking significance the more one reflects upon it. In newly emergent lands of the earth, where the quest for liberation from external powers is threatened anew by super-nationalisms within, where political necessities of development are at the same time economically difficult, where movements toward peoples' unities are imperilled by the aberrations of provincialism, and where traditions of enlightenment in law and society are undermined by intense emotional identifications — in such situations the question posed for higher learning is whether it can assist creatively in the providing of patience, of long-range vision, of a clear acknowledgment of the facts, of reasoned apprehension of the present and anticipation of the future. Can the universities be instruments of humane reason and of the human spirit? Equally so, though in a different way, the question posed for higher learning in established or older societies is whether the universities can provide more than antiquities, whether they can be more than museums, i.e., whether they can provide insights and incentives essential to continued change and a dynamic sense of human history. Can the universities be instruments of inspiration and new human thrust, rather than the complacent institutions of

societies threatened by the ebb-tides of historical consciousness?

Such questions as these are relevant for various types of higher educational institutions. They can challenge the traditional universities, as well as "Christian colleges" and even technical institutes, to reappraise anew the basic tasks of higher learning today. To be sure, colleges and universities have an enduring mission wherever they are — a mission with respect to man's knowledge of truth in all spheres of disciplined rational inquiry: the mission is to search it out, to transmit it anew and revise the old in light of the new, and to provide some of the skills and techniques for its humane application to the whole range of human needs. Colleges and universities are called upon, moreover, to perform their mission as part of a total community of the intellect and academic life, to practice the standards of excellence, to have respect for the spoken and written word, and to interrelate learning and living. These are component aspects of their mission, their perennial duty, and their means of livelihood with respect to society.

These elements in the mission of the academic community are set, nevertheless, within the context of a task, i.e., of what the Bible speaks of as a "vocation" or calling. In this context it is called upon to see itself in a particular moment of time and within the concreteness of a given place. The pressing task of colleges and universities is their immediate calling — to see their mission

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

in terms of relevance for human anxiety and need and to appraise their mission anew each day against the background of a vital sense of history. It is in this light that they may renew a sense of urgency and meaning. In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East they may impart a relevant sense of patience; in America they may yet be able to instill a "vision of greatness" and have students become excited again about the living issues of human life.

This is the great mission seen as the indispensable task of the present. Can it be realized? Perhaps not totally, for colleges and universities do not fully determine their cultural environments. They are, in part, subject to conditions

which they reflect but can not completely mold. But they can be aware of the need to recover a sense of the urgent present. Despite the fact that the university's tradition is hallowed and ancient, there can be communities within the academic world whose sense of the total task is quickened. We may well hope and pray that Christian scholars and Christian communities of scholars will be found among those who hear and respond to not only the perennial mission of learning but also to the vocation from man and God to be faithful to their task. What is more basic to such a sensitivity than the knowledge of God's work in history wherein through Christ he has called us into the liberty of being his sons?

The Crisis of Vocation

CARL MICHALSON

... The fears we know are of not knowing. Will night-fall bring us some awful order — keep a hardware store in a small town. . . . Teach science for life to progressive girls —? It is getting late. Shall we ever be asked for? Are we simply not wanted at all?

— W. H. Auden, *The Age of Anxiety*.

You fool! The best job is the one you have.

— Martin Luther, *Sermon on Luke 2:8-20*.

Our daily work is an arena in which our justifiability as men is being continually tested. This is not always known or acknowledged because the demands of earning a living seem so much more paramount. Almost anyone can earn a living. But in order to do so he must invest the majority of his waking hours. Into the product of his labor a man must pour what Karl Marx called "congealed working time." That is why most working people are clock watchers. Their lives are like a talisman, a magic skin which they hold in their hands. At every stroke of the clock you can feel the skin shrink, and when the skin is gone, life will be over. One pours his life into his job. That is why the paramount question pertains not to earning a living but to vindicating one's investment of his life. You can appreciate, then, that it is not simply grimness which causes the Frenchman Arthur Rimbaud to cry out, "Human toil! That is the explosion which lights up my abyss from time to time."

Many of the explosive crises in vocational life are utterly situational. Given a little prudent adjustment of the conditions surrounding our work or a little plastic accommodation of our attitudes, the critical element vanishes.

There are clashes of circumstance, for instance. The fact that work is now being widely considered as a universal right bespeaks the deep-seated need of men for a vocation. Let a general situation of unemployment arise, and this basic need to work expresses itself not simply as a fear of starvation but as a frustration of one's essential humanity. Retirement affects men in the same way. A recent advertisement in *The New York Times* for part-time workers brought hundreds of applications from retired men. Strike threats evoke widespread anxiety for the same

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

reason. The loom of industry is the womb of a nation's psychological security. Man is a working animal whose very being is at stake in his handiwork; and when he cannot work, he cannot esteem himself.

Another circumstance is the popular situation where vocational preferences collide with all sorts of distasteful vocational by-products. One does not mind his job so much as the tedium and long hours: what Joseph Conrad once called the "prosaic severity" of daily work. He likes to tinker with motors but not to wash his hands. He likes to sell groceries but he does not like to stack the shelves. He likes to make contacts but not to fill out the reports on his contacts. He likes to do research but not meet classes. He likes to preach but not to call. Or, as in the special case of women, they would like a career but they would also like marriage and motherhood. Vocational life is a kind of package deal: one takes the bad with the good.

Likewise there is a fatiguing competitiveness in vocational situations. He must compete first of all for the job he wants. Once in the job, he must compete with his fellow workers for status on the job. Worst of all, he must compete with himself for the realization of his own ambition for himself. Occasionally the competitive situation is ambushed from deep within one's past where the expectations of one's parents have so dominated one's vocational mind that any independent direction weighs one down with the guilt burden of a patricide.

At times the circumstances of work become such as to raise the question of personal suitability. When this question is raised, the talisman grows taut in our hand and we can peek more deeply into the abyss of our lives. For instance, one may feel deeply destined to be an artist; but who can live on the income of most artists? Or to be a doctor; but who can become a doctor who is not already affluent enough to put himself through medical school? There are not many bank tellers who can escape their cage for a life of aesthetic abandon in the South Seas. But what is the alternative to that for a man whose spirit beats like the wings of a bird against the confinement of his job? He must settle for amateur status in the vocation for which he feels destined to be a professional. As James Agate has said, "A professional is a man who can do his job when he doesn't feel like it. An amateur is a man who can't do his job when he does feel like it."

But what if our sense of destiny is nudging us into a vocation for which we lack the abilities for distinction? Our destiny is then a devil sentencing us to the most acute confrontation with the fear of failure. Many a young man in a burst of idealism has said to himself, "I would rather be a second-rate lawyer than a first-rate clerk!" There is no quicker way to shrivel the talisman than that. The realities of our talents must be gauged to the demands of a vocation or we disintegrate ourselves with the constant sense of falling short.

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

Another critical clash which enters into vocational life has to do with moral values. Every worker is by the nature of his job suspended midway between the question of the profit of the employer and the question of the welfare of the employee. In some well-ordered enterprises this is no alternative, for the conditions are synonymous. To serve the employer is the best way to serve yourself, or to serve yourself is the best way to serve your employer. There are still many instances, however, where vocational circumstances are such as to encourage the mutual exploitation and depersonalization of employer and employee.

Values also clash when one is forced to choose between a life of service to others and a life of socially acceptable self-interest. Teachers face this in deciding between serving needy, small country schools at less salary and status, and serving relatively well-equipped urban schools at more salary and status. Doctors face it when they must decide between a practice among low-income groups receiving inadequate medical attention and high-income groups accustomed to the best and able to pay for it. Everyone faces the decision in choosing between gainful enterprises and service enterprises notoriously unrewarding from a financial standpoint.

Once on the job, one discovers a set of mores and morals that jogs his tidy idealism. The office secretary must say "He's not in" when he is. The statesman must declare war, buy favor, and support unsavory riders for the sake of wholesome legislation. The laborer must "slow down" and go out on strike or isolate himself from organized labor which in many respects is industry's conscience.

Probably the most popular clash in all vocational crises is the one that has developed out of society's sheer vocational inertia. According to the Old Testament, work is the device by which God has punished mankind for his unfaithfulness. Since the sin of Adam, man is sentenced to earn his bread by sweat. (Genesis 3:17-19; Ps. 90:10; Job 7:1ff; Ecclesiastes 6:7) Whether God would do a thing like that will be debated by theologians, but there is no room for doubt that much daily work today answers to the description of a punishment. The sheer biological demands of staying alive, or, more lately, of living well, have dominated the history of work. Hence, the question of what the work can do for the spirit of the man emerges too late to answer it efficiently. Men with strong individualistic tendencies get caught in rigid vocational systems. Men with a fine feeling for personal relations suddenly discover themselves being victimized by automation. Men with deep-seated passions to serve their fellow-men come to themselves in jobs whose ends are not apparent beyond the thickly impersonal walls of their offices or factories. Like a dirge, the words of the poet Hölderlin echo through the hollow chambers of these lives:

And the wheel of stale usage
Day by day wears away the soul.

Hell is a job in which a man who lives by his lungs is forced to work under water.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

It is almost as if the Old Testament were right about work as a penalty. As Simone de Beauvoir has said, "There is no more obnoxious way to punish a man than to force him to perform acts which make no sense to him."

The harrowing crises in vocational life, however, emanate from the deep, sub-conscious anxieties, the failure to know who we are, the setting up of a lie about ourselves and attempting to prove the lie a truth through the medium of our chief life-time occupations. And if the lie does not come off? The same medium we used as a testing grounds of the validity of our lie we turn into a torture chamber for punishing the guilt of our detected lie.

A person who enters into vocational life as if it were the scale of his success courts the gravest spiritual perils. One who requires his vocational life to vindicate his very being asks of the vocation something it was not meant to give. Students should know about this tactic. Odd how after submitting a paper or completing an examination the student cannot rest with his knowledge of his intellectual acquisitions. He is ridden by curiosity as to how he has done, and he haunts his professors with the question, "How did I make out?" Pride of achievement outreaches achievement and even cripples the faculties by which achievement is come by. The tactic should be familiar to everyone because it was the main device used in childhood. The joy in approbation from one's peers was more pleasant than the thrill of the achievement itself. When a student looks into the eyes of a professor with the same panic eagerness for approval with which a child searches out the eyes of his parent, we have a ridiculously anachronistic situation. But when the same immature demand for the satisfaction of the pride ideal is carried over into vocational life, the anachronism becomes acutely critical. Is that not the pathos in Auden's lines:

... To be young means to be all on edge, to be held waiting in a packed lounge for a Personal Call from Long Distance, for the low voice that defines one's future. . . . The fears we know are of not knowing. Will night-fall bring us some awful order — keep a hardware store in a small town. . . . Teach science for life to progressive girls —? It is getting late. Shall we ever be asked for? Are we simply not wanted at all?

Is this not also the tragedy in Conrad's *Nostromo*? As Senora Teresa gasps to Nostromo in her dying moments, "Always thinking of yourself and taking your pay out in fine words from those who care nothing for you." But Nostromo can only reply, "I am engaged in a work of very great moment. . . . I am needed!"

Vocational crisis is in the making when one needs to be needed. The sign of the crisis is the compulsiveness in work. How else account for the mild symptoms called "Sunday neurosis?" Away from the emotional support of vocational approbation, a man is at his wit's end. He may have neatly arranged his time so that it would pass rapidly before he returns to work on Monday. He may have planned the day at a double-header. But it rains. He is lost. He needs to be needed; the

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

Sabbath affords no self-laudatory work; he will anesthetize himself against his need with baseball; the rain washes away the magic drug.

If employed people feel this lack of support on their day off, fancy the torture which retirement inflicts upon the vocationally compulsive. Even worse, can you comprehend the trauma incipient in the disability of a younger person who has put all the eggs of self-vindication in the single basket of vocational life. Case histories are replete with instances of persons unable to pursue their line of work by virtue of a crippling disease or accident, who have taken the attitude that life is no longer worth living.

See, then, the toll that is taken upon the personality when vocational life is set within the pride system. The rebellious seems to aim too high. He entertains only the picture of himself as a success and will resist any suggestion that he is not. He is smugly satisfied with his achievements because they were indicated in his talents from the beginning. The truth is that it is not his achievements which satisfy him but the way in which they vindicate his pride ideal. He can be crushed by failure, not because any particular failure is objectively ruinous, but because failure in any degree is utterly alien to his view of himself. Failure is taken not as vocational defeat but as self-defeat. More often, however, he will not accept the verdict of failure. He will blame the circumstances. He did not "get the breaks"; he did not know the right people; he was victimized by unscrupulous associates, etc. Like everyone else, he has too much to do at work. But he generally is not fatigued because he needs much to do in order to certify his concept of himself as omniscient.

The recessive, on the other hand, seems to aim too low. He does so not out of lack of ambition. Actually he keeps himself down so as not to offend others whose approbation he dearly desires. His aim in life seems modest not because he lacks high ideals but because all his ideals are *too* staggering, and in self-defense he must compromise with them. Success depresses him. Hence, the instance of the novelist who, on the day it was announced that his book was a best seller, took his life. Failure cannot hurt him, for when it comes he is prepared to receive it in philosophical self-deprecation. "I am no good," he will say. Not because he believes he is no good, but because he must take that attitude toward himself in order to spare himself the worse punishment of having to hear it for the first time from someone else. He is always fatigued. He should be, for he takes on anything that is asked of him. He needs to be needed. The result is over-work. He will work hard and do many things, but he will reject offers of major responsibility. Like the Texas carpenter, asked to step into the post of foreman, he will decline, saying "Nope, I just want to hue out from the neck down."

The resigned does not aim at all. He is a free lance, a playboy. He is a vocational opportunist, resists the regimentation and routine implicit in vocational life,

and seemingly cannot maintain the continuity of responsibility required for holding a job. He may seem well adjusted to his work, because when he is off the job he can play with abandon. He does not take his work home with him. The truth of the situation, however, is that he is simply a playboy. His work is so oppressive to him that he cannot wait to get off the job to flounder freely in undemanding occupations so amply provided by our culture in the world of entertainment and recreation. He is an attractive type because he will not seek his self-solution as the rebellious and recessive do, in such complete seriousness about work. His fault lies in his building his life upon the strategy of detachment from those devices, with nothing genuinely liberating to take their place. He is like a man who is continually breaking jail, but never vindicating himself and settling down.

Now, what is the point of dragging you through this lengthy pathology of the vocational life? Simply to observe what a gap exists between the black swamp of self-torture and aimlessness which one can make of his working life and the view of oneself that is available in a life of faith. The word "vocation" in the history of man has become a synonym for something from which you can hardly wait to get a vacation. "Vocation" in the history of Christianity, however, was the word for salvation. Vocation in the New Testament is God's call to man which delivers him from the assorted tyrannies of the world — sin, death, and the devil — and ushers him into a life of joy and peace. What has come in between to distort the meaning of vocation?

What has happened in the history of Christianity is somewhat parallel to what happens in the Old Testament account of how work came to be a thing to dread. God created man in His own image, and God, the creator, was a worker. Man, in God's image, was therefore designed to be a worker. But, according to the Old Testament, sin entered. Man chose his own image of himself and attempted to negotiate life in that image. He saw himself no longer responsible to God but rather as being like God, with the knowledge of good and evil. The image just could not be carried off. It was not the truth about man, but a lie. One who lies about himself creates a situation where the needs for camouflage and rationalization are so demanding that the opportunities for wholesome self-development are tortuously confined. This tension began to show in man's work. He worked no longer as a gardener, as God originally employed him. He worked for bread, by sweat. Gardening is an occupation in which there is no difference between the professional and the amateur status. But when one must enter the sacred fields and forests with the acquisitive instincts which the struggle for survival forces upon him, the sweat of his brow becomes a vile perfume to remind him, if he has the nose to smell, that he is somehow living against his true vocation.

The New Testament used the word "vocation" to signify man's salvation. It did not yet apply this word to daily work. In fact, the New Testament heralded

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

the coming of God's kingdom which would supplant the world in its present phase, and, with the world, the daily work required in it. Hence, no great emphasis was placed on worldly work in a day when the world was regarded as doomed.

The Middle Ages began to adopt a different attitude toward work. The kingdom of God, it believed, had already come in a sense in the form of the church. Therefore, those who worked for the church were doing saving work, holy work. They had a vocation in the New Testament meaning because what they were doing represented the redeeming call of God producing in their lives the effects of joy and peace. Those who were not working in the church had a worldly work, and their redemption was contingent upon the holy work of monks, nuns, and priests. The first systematic presentation of this attitude toward work was given by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. But the attitude had prevailed in the thinking of the church for a thousand years. In summary, the attitude involved two positions toward work: First, worldly work is the punishment for sin. It cannot be regarded as having a redemptive dimension. Second, the holy work is a higher kind of work.

Martin Luther, with no reputation for tact, tolerance, or temperance, broke down the wall between worldly work and holy work with the blasphemous claim that men who worked in the world with their hands were redemptively *more* significant than the so-called holy men, the monks. Luther based his blast upon a hitherto neglected verse from the letters of Paul, I Cor. 7:20. In this verse Paul enjoins the early Christians to stay within the calling whereunto they are called. In saying this, Paul apparently uses the same word for one's worldly work as he uses for the divine election to salvation. According to Luther, this is Paul's way of saying that not everything that is holy goes on at church, and with that tiny wedge from the New Testament he broke through the "conceit of the walls" of the church and allowed the church to break into society at this point of very great relevance, the vocational life.

Hear these lines from one of his Christmas sermons, based upon the text from Luke about the shepherds: "And there were in the same country shepherds abiding in the fields, keeping watch over their flocks by night."

That was a mean job, watching flocks by night. Common sense calls it low-down work, and men who do it are regarded as trash. But the Evangelist lauds the angels because they proclaimed their message only to shepherds watching their flocks by night. . . . And what did they do? . . . They stayed in their station and did the work of their calling. They were pure in heart and content with their work, not aspiring to be townsmen or nobles, nor envious of the mighty. Next to faith this is the highest art — to be content with the calling in which God has placed you. (Roland Bainton's Translation)

Now four things should be said rapidly and pointedly about Luther's handling of this text from Paul. First, his exegesis is wrong. Paul does not say what Luther says he does. Paul only applies the word calling to the life of salvation, not at all to daily work. Second, Luther's position about remaining in one's worldly work became a kind of theological justification for feudalism, with its rigid vocational caste system still so central to the economies of European countries. Third, the Roman Catholic Church has since the Protestant Reformation redefined its position in the direction of Luther's. (See *Rerum novarum* by Leo XIII in 1891 and *Quadragesimo anno* by Pius XI in 1931.) Fourth, John Calvin found it possible to introduce the dimension of saving significance into worldly work without the help of Luther's dubious exegesis.

The fourth point is the important point. The Protestant Reformation helped to make it clear to Christians who were pouring their lives into their daily work that their life of faith was not suspended during working hours. Their vocational life was the arena in which God's calling was to be worked out. The consequence of that perspective was a repristination of work as divinely significant, a concept of the worker not as the victim of evil but as a steward in God's garden.

It is my conviction that when the worker understands himself in his work as one who is in the image of God, under responsibility to God and receiving the benefits of God's mercy in his working life, the crises that come to a head in his vocational experience are sizably reduced. In the main, he learns that his vocation is not the arena for his self-vindication. To think that it is may be bad theology, built upon a doctrine of the fall of man which has not yet heard that God has overcome the power of evil and that there is therefore now no condemnation. It may also be bad psychology, tempting man to seek the gratifications of life from his work, whereas the opposite relation is the more wholesome. One has a satisfactory relation to his work when the worker is a satisfied man.

One who understands himself vocationally as in the image of God will adopt several attitudes of crucial importance to his well-being as a worker. For one thing, he will understand *the essential democracy of all vocations*. The dignity of work does not inhere in the nature of the work. Therefore, people cannot enhance their sense of self-esteem by comparing jobs. The dignity of work inheres in the way in which God is related to the work. As Martin Luther has said, every kind of work has its necessity and meaning in "the command of God." And as Calvin concurred, we are to do everything including our work for the glory of God.

Einstein was wrong, then, to say that if he had his life to live over again he would "rather choose to be a plumber or a peddler" than a "scientist or scholar or teacher." He was, of course, engaging in justifiable hyperbole as an attack upon government security procedures which were crippling scholarly research. He was wrong in the first place to imply the hierarchial inferiority of some work to others. He was

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

wrong in the second place because one does not hold his work as something he has chosen but as something for which he has been chosen. He can only choose his being chosen, and it seems clear that Einstein and others are chosen to be scientists. The father who says, "My son will be a carpenter!" is only kidding. He knows he cannot choose his son's vocation: that would be a contradiction in the term. And he is actually only expressing the disillusionment with professional life which his own frustrations have forced upon him. There is, of course, a kind of hierarchy among vocations based upon adaptability, which vocational aptitude tests are benevolently designed to help us determine. As Alexander Miller says in *Christian Faith and My Job*, "Many heaven-sent mechanics, born in Christian homes, have been turned into doctors to the public danger because of the false status given to the professions." The personal dangers to a vocational misfit are as great as the dangers to the public. Hence, one must applaud the wisdom of Sancho Panza's wife, Teresa, in *Don Quixote*. Sancho, led on by the Don's fancies, confides to his wife intensely, "If I did not expect to see myself governor of an island before long, I would drop down dead on the spot." Or, as most people say, I will become somebody or die in the attempt! The consequence is often a slow process of psychological self-deterioration brought on by failure, the fear of failure, and the corrosive effect of self-accusation. But Teresa wisely replies, "Nay, then, husband, . . . you came out of your mother's womb without a government, you have lived until now without a government, and when it is God's will you will go, or be carried to your grave without a government. How many there are in the world who live without a government, and continue to live all the same, and are reckoned in the number of the people."

In a day when the public mind gauges one's worth by his vocation, there is psychological and spiritual health in knowing that in God's eyes no vocation is worth more than another. "The best job is the one you have." Or, as Luther also says, "Do not say, 'if I were'; say, 'I am'."

Does this mean that God is utterly indiscriminating when it comes to varieties of work? Calvin answers that in his comment on I Cor. 7:20: "Let no one use this saying to perpetuate modes of life which are plainly impious and immoral." Which means, you do not encourage a bartender, a bricklayer, or a banker to change his job. You simply ask him to take God into it. If there is room, God stays and he then may stay.

Does this mean that God does not call men to specific vocations? It means virtually that. The calling of God is a calling to salvation. It comes to you where you are. The priority, then, is not with the question as to what you should do but with the question as to whether you will admit God into what you are doing. Finding God's will for one's vocational life is like finding His will for anything else. It is plainly difficult, considering the slowness of our spirits, the complexity of life's issues, and the hiddenness of God. The most important thing is not to know God's

will but to know that God's will is the most important thing. As the Roman Catholic monk, Thomas Merton, has said in his sensitive way, "Our vocation is not a supernatural lottery but the interaction of two freedoms, God's and ours."

Another redemptive perspective upon vocational crisis is given us in the promise of *deliverance from the moral burden* with which some work ladens us. Nothing so binds us to this world as our work. But the world is a morally ambiguous place, constantly diluting our purest ideals. There are several types of Christian solutions to the world relation, all applicable to our work, but not all adequate. For instance, one may compromise with the world. In this case he will resolve the tension between his standards and the demands of the world by leaving faith out of his worldly work. He will become the economic man, the worldly man. One cannot adopt this solution and still be in the world for *God's* sake.

Or, one may renounce the world. His conflict with the infection of worldly life will be solved by sealing himself off from the infection in some kind of hermetic sanitation. He will do "religious" work; or he will establish colonies for "Christian economics." In doing this, he qualifies as a Christian in the respect that he is not "of the world" but he defaults as a Christian because he is no longer "in the world." A Christian ought not sell out to the world; but neither ought he allow the world to run its course independent of Christian influence. It is obvious that a man may solve his private problem by withdrawing from business or politics, but this kind of monasticism does little to solve the problems of business and politics.

Or, one may attempt a utopian revolution of the world. He will not be a worldly man and he will not be a monk; he will be a martyr. That is, he will demonstrate that he can live in the world of business and politics in open competition with less principled bases of life, endeavoring always to implement the pure ideals of the Christian kingdom. This, of course, sounds like the most heroic and admirable of all the possible positions. It is the "harmless as a dove" strategy, lacking only in the "wise as a serpent" method. Pure ideals in an impure world are precariously brittle. They can be broken in the collision. That, indeed, would be martyrdom. But martyrdom in which the pure ideal is broken by the impure world while the impure world is allowed to move ahead unchanged is socially uncreative. The point about life in the world is not simply to hold high ideals but to change the world. A politician who overplays his high ideals to the defeat of the party may have lost the very implement by which idealism is introduced into society. A businessman who overplays his high ideals may find himself insolvent. Not only is he left without the means for influencing the business world. He is made ironically dependent upon its relief agencies.

Is there a fourth way? Is there an alternative to compromise, monasticism, or martyrdom in one's daily work? There is. One who knows himself as the image of God can know two things about himself: one, that he is designed for work in the

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

world; the other, that even when he is unacceptable to himself, God accepts him. This kind of self-understanding in one's work is the way of justification by faith. One stays in the world, willing to be damned by the world for the glory of God, firmly grasping the implements of the world as devices for turning back the world's evil, even at the risk of being compromised and infected by those very implements. Luther's slogan is the battle cry of this method: "Sin bravely!" One can be courageous about his conflict with the world because, as Luther said in his letter to Melancthon, he can "believe firmly" in the willingness of God to accept even those who are unacceptable. This is not simply a strategy of compromise because it has as its goal the changing of the world. It is obviously not monasticism because it knows it must use the implements of the world in order to effect the change. It is not martyrdom because it knows that most dead men do not move things. One who understands himself as justified by faith, as living by the righteousness of God, knows that it is his obligation to change the world when he can. And when he cannot? He must sin bravely *until* he can change the world and in order to change the world, or until God changes it for him.

Finally, one who understands himself as in the image of God may bring to his work a kind of meaningful life which he ought not expect his work to provide for him. This is what might be called *the internalization of an external necessity*, to adapt a phrase from Erich Fromm. Man is a worker. That is ineradicable. And the nature of work is not always pleasant. It is routine, irksome, and often meaningless. Men who seek their self-vindication in their work, therefore, often starve themselves psychologically and spiritually.

In the present complicated phase of society one cannot always guarantee that work will be meaningful. Nevertheless, Paul's command to the Thessalonian church still holds for us: "If any one will not work, let him not eat." (2 Thess. 3:10) Socially necessary work must proceed even when it is psychologically unrewarding. But then, as Meister Eckhart has said, "Work does not make us holy. Instead, we must make the work holy." This is what the psychologist means by internalizing an external necessity. We must let our duty become our desire, not depending for the meaning of our life upon our work, but letting the meaningful lives *confer* meaning upon our work. Self-realization was not meant to be the result of work. It is the indispensable presupposition of work.

Can you sell that idea to the man who stands at the same machine day in and day out tightening bolts on an automobile chassis? Or even to a school-teacher, about whom Strindberg has said, "Teaching is decidedly harder than standing by a screw or the crane of a machine, and equally monotonous." A man's work is his life, and no man wants to die for eight hours a day. Yet he stands by his machine which raps out its meaninglessness to an iambic rhythm,

Slip turn slip turn
Slip turn slip turn

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

His whole spirit surrenders to the beat of his work, and his life takes on the aspect of a dirge.

O curse the day
That ever I
Was born for this!

But if a dirge, why not a lyric?

She loves me
She loves me not!

Yet lyricism is a form of day-dreaming which merely gives in to one's work or dulls one's senses against its ill effects. It does nothing to transform the moment of work with a meaning that is not implicit in the work. I propose, rather, that the way to transform work with meaning is to let the rhythm of work beat out the meter for a liturgy. Something out of the Psalms, for instance, such as:

The Lord's my shepherd I'll not want
He makes me down to lie. (Scottish Meter)

The principle is sound. T. North Whitehead defends it in the essay "Meaningful Jobs for Whole People:"

In our modern industrial civilization it seems inevitable that most people should be paid workers, and it is of the very first importance that their jobs should be meaningful to them. But I suggest that we shall not get much farther in our thinking if we fix our eyes too narrowly on the job, because what has to be made meaningful is not just the job by itself, but the lives of the workers, both when they are on the job and at all other times. (*Labor's Relation to the Church and Community*, Liston Pope, Editor)

If a man's life is not whole with meaning, there is little his work can do to supply that wholeness. For wholeness of meaning comes when a man understands who he is, the image of God, responsible to His being and the beneficiary of His mercies. *Without* that meaning, the mature demands of our work will only expose the echoing emptiness in our life, or at best, stuff it momentarily with the unacoustical packing of sheer business. *With* that meaning, even the most irksome requirements of work can be transformed into an act of daily worship. The times in which we feel our life diminishing like a talisman can be redeemed by the sense of our affiliation with the only reality which time does not fade.

"Illumined" Liberal Education

RICHARD N. BENDER

Surely it is evident to all who are likely to think seriously upon the question that the Church related college must be first of all a good college. No responsible educational leader representing any major Christian communion would justify academic incompetence in the name of piety. To say that the Church related college must be a good college means that it must be good according to the criteria by which any educational institution must be evaluated: a faculty of first-rate scholars and teachers; adequate library, laboratory, and classroom facilities; a curriculum well-conceived to articulate the goals of the institution; reasonable admission and graduation standards; students of average or better capacity; adequate student personnel and guidance service; administrative competence; financial stability. Yet the Church related college must be more than good by these general criteria.

I

The need for this kind of institution roots in the deepest concerns of our time. Contemporary events are demonstrating the brokenness of society, the destructive power of human sin, and a frustration in personal life which our multiplication of gadgets and creams serves only to underline. Indeed it would seem that the very mind-set and the socio-economic patterns requisite to technological achievement (the value of which none should discount) have intensified the problems of the person and society. Minds and institutions limited to thinking in terms of mathematical formulae, to measuring quantitatively, and to equating verification with experimental method are ill-suited to deal with problems of value, responsibility, purpose, significance, fulfilment, and salvation. The impersonality of urbanization tends more and more to turn persons into units to which such fundamental virtues as integrity, guilelessness, trust, charity, and forbearance seldom have meaning.

To this condition of contemporary culture the Christian faith is relevant. The Christian is bold enough to speak in faith to a scientific age because of the dilemma cited above — the unscientific character of the most deep-lying problems we have to face. This faith is fundamentally a commitment to live in love as children of a Father-God whose own love empowers one so to live. Within this faith a new dimension is added to the quest for wisdom about the meaning of life — the divine-human dimension. Likewise within the faith one is introduced to a whole new quality of category for taking hold of human problems; among these are the categories of sin, repentance, forgiveness, incarnation, grace, redemption.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The role of the Church related college is to be a scholarly community unique for its central intention to foster an educational program to which the divine-human dimension is indigenous. Here the quest for truth about man and his problems is broadened to include the categories of the Christian faith as well as those of the physical and social sciences.

The Church related college need claim no monopoly on this kind of education. It can and does occur in state and private institutions. The uniqueness of the Church related college will be the extent to which such a goal will be a "central intention" of the entire institution, beginning with the trustees, including the administration, specifically expressed in the professional work of the faculty, and extending to the students as rapidly as they can be incorporated into this kind of community. The state institution by its nature cannot hold such an intention central, and the private institution which has no working relationship to any body of the Christian faith is unlikely to do so consistently. They have their essential contributions to make to the needs of our culture and so, also, does the Church related college.

The term "Christian education" is a slippery one, and for this reason I hesitate to use it to describe the role of the Church related college. I can come more precisely to what I am attempting to say by following E. Harris Harbison in speaking of liberal education which is "illuminated" by Christian insight. Certainly the educational program of the Church related college must be liberal in the sense that it is "free, broadminded, catholic, sensitive to new facts and open to new truths."¹ Illumination comes through openness to the divine-human dimension of the task and through appropriation of the categories of the Faith to questions for which they are relevant.

There is no one "program" nor should there ever be. Each college must determine the content of its own program in light of its own tradition, constituency, and nature under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Yet enough honest searching and experimentation have gone on already to make it possible to state in broad outline some characteristics of liberal education illumined by the Christian faith:

1. Careful and scholarly study of the Judaeo-Christian religion, centering upon the Bible and indicating the influence of this religious heritage upon Western culture.
2. A faculty-wide concern to bring students face to face with the persistent questions of life and death and purpose to which the great religions speak.
3. Abandonment of the artificial pose of professorial neutrality on questions which by their very nature demand involvement and decision.
4. Creation of an on-going, campus-wide conversation regarding the relevance of the Christian faith to the questions with which, by its very nature, the academic community must come to grips.

¹E. Harris Harbison, "Liberal Education and Christian Education," in *The Christian Idea of Education*, ed. Edmund Fuller. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, pp. 61-62.

"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION

5. Cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity and major attention to the arts and their capacity to communicate levels of insight not available to verbal symbols.
6. A regular experience of college-wide worship in which administrator, teacher, and student feel themselves indeed called of God to the work of the scholar.
7. Opportunities for significant Christian social action which will entail the appropriation of the knowledge and skills found in the college to real personal and social problems.²
8. A quality of recreational and social life which is at once consistent in motivation with the nature of the institution and satisfying to the entire person.

Two characteristics indispensable to a college in which such an educational program is to succeed are rather unique in the educational world. One of these is a willingness to experiment in the development of new kinds of courses which often obliterate old departmental lines and lead to a continuing conversation regarding common problems. Another is a sense of the sacramental nature of scholarship dramatized by the corporate worship life.

What is being described here is almost unavoidably a liberal arts education. There will be some few local sets of circumstances justifying a more technical or vocational type of education, but the major contribution of Church related education will be through liberal arts. Within this framework the three classical divisions — science, social science, humanities — all will have their rightful places. Impoverishment in any of these areas will leave the graduate less able to live in the modern world.

Any liberal arts education undertakes to pass beyond mere transfer of information to understanding. It may be held with considerable foundation that an alliance with a community of faith is most directly in the interest of such an objective.³

II

The Church relationship of this kind of college is essential to its purpose and a clue to its uniqueness, not a fact for embarrassed apology. Understanding the significance of their relationship depends upon adequate understanding of the Church.

The Church is the necessary community of those who have been captivated by the love of God. It is fundamentally a community of commitment, expressing its common life in corporate worship, in Christian nurture, and in co-operative

²For instance, cf. the program in Community Dynamics at Earlham College under the direction of William W. Biddle.

³To pursue this contention through its various ramifications would carry us far away from the central focus of the present discussion. What is being suggested has to do with the *conceptional* nature of all "facts" and with the importance of *involvement* both in the critical judgment of factual allegations and in the measurement of their relevance to values. Both conceptualization and involvement may be facilitated by participation in a community of faith, even though the emerging "understanding" be in need of continual critical re-examination.

Christian action. It is tangible evidence of the social interdependence of persons even for the fulfilment of their highest ideals. It is evidence also that the love of God must express itself in and through human community. Only through permissive, forgiving, self-sacrificing fellowship of the loved is the love of God first known. The Church is called to be the "beloved community" through which personal and cultural reconciliation with God may be accomplished.

If the Church is to be this kind of fact in experience, organizational structure and division of responsibility are necessary. Because the Church is a human community every specific example of it falls far short of the ideal to which it aspires. Every organized church must be clearly distinguished from the spiritual Church. The specific college falls far short, also, of the ideal of "a community of masters and scholars in quest of knowledge." Yet to understand the Church and the college and the unique relationship upon which they have entered, each must be seen against the perspective of what at its best it aspires to be.

The kind of college I have been describing above must be sustained by the fellowship, the prayers, and the service of the Christian Church. No educational institution can exist in a vacuum. Its existence is made possible by a productive alliance with a community of common concern. The alliance with the Church is the tangible tie to an existent community which is willing and able to sustain the life of the college. The Christian Church is the only contemporary community whose own purposes and resources are capable of systematic support for an educational program "to which the divine-human dimension is indigenous."

There is another side to the coin. The Church desperately needs the college. When the Church has been at its worst was when it had lost the capacity to accept criticism from within and from without. By training, a devoted community of free Christian scholars can maintain the capacity for constructive self-criticism better than any other group within the Church.

Another and perhaps even more essential need for which the Church must depend on the college is the need for cultural leadership at once skilled and devout. If the Church takes seriously its role as mediator of the love of God to a culture seeking to recover meaning and direction, this kind of leadership is indispensable. The late Justice Robert Jackson observed in his final summation as chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg War Crimes trials, "The most serious crimes against civilization can be committed only by educated and technically competent people." Conversely, even the highest motives will be frustrated without technical competence. The Church related college is a major instrument through which Christian commitment is linked to trained and disciplined abilities.

The Church related college is sustained and made relevant through its alliance with the Christian Church. It renders to the Church those services that only a scholarly community can provide. Its essential contribution to the higher educa-

"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION

tional world stems from its central intention to demonstrate the relevance of the divine-human dimension to the educational task.

III

Fulfillment of the role of the Church related college in contemporary culture is dependent upon the entire community of which it is composed: the supporting Church, the board of trustees, the administration, the faculty, the student body, the alumni and general constituency. Since the central task of the college is education, the professional work of the faculty is the focal point through which the goals of the institution find concrete expression. The development of the kind of educational program I have described as central to the nature of the Church related college is certainly a faculty responsibility.

The goal must be a faculty of unusual erudition. It is seldom possible for the average small Church related college to enlist more than a few scholars who already possess such qualifications. It is possible however for a group of competent teachers who share a vision of what their institution might be to become such an unusual faculty. This could only occur as a result of co-operative, persistent effort on the part of both administration and faculty.

It is clear that the large majority of faculty members in the Church related college should be Christian. It is otherwise meaningless to speak of a community of scholars who regard the Christian categories as relevant. Elsewhere, I have developed in some detail what I mean by the term "Christian Professor."⁴ For me this does not involve precommitment to one body of propositions as against all others. Rather it has to do with a commitment to live in love in responsible community with a sense of divine vocation in teaching, with being nurtured in the brotherhood of the Christian Church, with concern for integrity as scholar and as Christian, and with witness to the faith within the common task.

The Christian teacher does not claim access to special data for scholarly research. He need not (I would say *cannot*) speak of "Christian knowledge," "Christian physics," "Christian literature," or "Christian psychology." He does not claim exemption from the dilemmas which arise within the complexities of personal and social life. What he does believe is that the fundamental need of himself and of all men is for a new relationship to God in Christ. He believes that this relationship casts new horizons around the entire intellectual enterprise and that it has metaphysical, epistemological, and valuational entailments. He believes that the reality of God in human experience introduces a new and relevant variable into every social situation and a new motivational factor into all personal behavior. He believes that history portrays the participation of God in human affairs sometimes in the birth of a babe called to a special service, sometimes in the fires of

⁴Cf. Richard N. Bender, "On Being a Christian Professor," *The Christian Scholar*, June 1957, pp. 117-125.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

judgment. He believes these matters in freedom and in conviction that the weight of the evidence is on their side.

There should be no question regarding intellectual freedom in the Church related college. Without such freedom there is no scholarship, nor personality.

The primary roots of man's need for intellectual freedom lie in the fundamental fact that he actually is free — as observer, inquirer, critic of his environment and of himself. . . . The demand for intellectual freedom, therefore, is not merely a demand that strong human impulses shall attain satisfaction. It is even more fundamentally a demand that artificial restraint of one sort or another shall not be permitted to contradict the primary reality of human existence.⁵

The recruitment of the faculty for a Church related college is of fundamental importance. Many problems regarding intellectual freedom will be avoided if faculty recruitment is well handled. Often discussions of this topic seem to presuppose that for every faculty vacancy there is a sizable number of equally qualified applicants and that the principal problem is to select from this group those who are "Christians." Nothing could be more unrealistic. The fact is that often there are no applicants, and none who might reasonably be approached have given much if any thought to what it means to be a Christian professor. Unfortunately, academic qualification is not always accompanied by a well-developed Christian commitment. There is no basis on which one could justify the selection of a genuinely pious but incompetent chemist to head a chemistry department. Sometimes it is possible to enlist a competent scholar who is also in the finest sense a Christian. Fortunate is the college that can identify and attract its fair share of such teachers. Nevertheless the faculty recruitment policy must take account of the realistic necessity of accepting a large proportion of teachers who are at best only casually Christian if at all.

When negotiations with a potential member of the faculty are under way, the unique nature of the Church related college should be a major topic of discussion. This presupposes that the college community has clearly defined its own nature and articulated its goals and that these are important in the development of the educational program. As a minimum, an invitation to join such a faculty should be extended only on assurance that the candidate believes in this kind of education, that its goals are valid, and that to teach in such an institution would be an opportunity to do the kind of teaching he most wants to do.

In the absence of such minimal assurance of compatibility, it often would be preferable to bear the inconvenience of leaving a post unfilled for a year or more. Even in situations where employment of an instructor is imperative, only temporary

⁵Robert Calhoun, "The Historical Relation between Religion and Intellectual Freedom," in *Religion and Freedom of Thought*. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954, p. 26.

"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION

arrangements should be made until someone likely to be a constructive part of the Christian community may be found.

On the teacher's part, he cannot with integrity accept an invitation to teach in such an institution if he holds serious reservations when the minimal points suggested above are faced. The very fact that one chooses to teach in a Church related college should be an expression of freedom and responsibility.

Granting that the faculty must be predominantly staffed by Christian professors, does this mean there is no place for a member of another faith or an agnostic? My own conviction is that there are many serious liabilities entailed by any attempt to enlist *only* Christian professors. For one thing there is no accurate way to decide in the process of selecting a faculty just who is a Christian and who is not. This can so easily become a denial of intellectual freedom or a magnification of sectarian trivia. It is more effective to attempt to arrive at a feeling of mutuality and common appreciation of the Church related college with the candidate. For the most part the nature of this kind of education and what it entails for the professor will help both the college and the candidate to understand whether or not he belongs. Additionally there is the fact that some professors who in all honesty *cannot* regard themselves as Christians could still appreciate the Church related college and its goals and make constructive contributions to it.

Quite obviously this will necessitate bringing all candidates to the campus and allowing them to meet and converse with administrators and potential colleagues. While such procedure is expensive in time and money, there is no better investment for the Church related college which takes seriously its educational role.

When once the new member of the faculty has begun his teaching duties, he must be assimilated into the college community. This means far more than getting his family involved in Church and the social life of the town, important as these may be. Basically it means helping him to become oriented to the college and its goals, to share in its intellectual and spiritual fellowship, and to be encouraged to make his own contribution to the growth of this community. The orientation and assimilation of new faculty members are worthy of much time and effort. Of great importance is the informal give and take of conversation that escapes banality and centers upon real concerns of serious educators. Roland Frye has written with keen insight:

We cannot assume that our customary emphasis on "good teaching" alone will accomplish this result when, as is often the case, we overburden teachers to the point where they become pedants as surely and as swiftly as do the myopically productive scholars. We must seek means not only to train but to sustain faculties which are made up of men of thought, men of humane wisdom, not mere counters, measurers, and diligent graders, but men concerned with significance, men who are assessors of life. There

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

must be constructive leisure with a premium on contemplation, on good talk and on good art, all of which are so often ignored in our culture.*

This "contemplation" should include much attention to basic assumptions upon which contemporary culture is built and to the value commitments which help to determine personal and social action. Such a faculty should seek some sophistication regarding the Judaeo-Christian religious heritage and major contemporary theological thought. The faculty in the Church related college cannot legitimately segregate itself from the faculty Christian movement, both because of what the movement can do for a faculty and because of what such a faculty can give to the movement.

In addition to "good talk" much can be accomplished in well-planned faculty retreats and seminars in which the articulation of the educational goals of the institution is the point of focus. Many new teachers who begin with only a minimal acceptance of the validity of Church related education can be led to new insights through interaction with a Christian faculty community. This is the Church functioning at its best in the educational context.

The only proper rein upon intellectual freedom is scholarly responsibility. No really mature scholar thinks of himself as performing in splendid isolation. He understands that he is engaged in a community enterprise of education; that this community has a nature and goals to which he has given at least tentative approval by his presence; that if these goals need changing, this is a function of the community itself in which the professor participates constructively and by which he grows; that he has not confirmed his own freedom until he contributes through his devotion as scholar and teacher to the fulfilment of the common enterprise.

In the Church related college whose educational program is in the hands of free and responsible scholars there should be no closed questions. To live in the creative tension between faith and the critical spirit is the calling of the Church related college. Only then can the Faith be refined and scholarship illumined.

Of such, I believe, is the role and the responsibility of the Church related college in contemporary culture. That the legitimate goals of this kind of college are directly relevant to the deepest needs of our era is increasingly clear. If the task seems staggering, close to impossible, that is a hopeful sign. Small vision and small plans deserve only small success. If the church related college can envision a strategic contribution to contemporary life and can demonstrate its capacity to fill such a role, it will find unprecedented support and a nearly unlimited opportunity to shape the future of our common life.

*Roland M. Frye, "The Church College and Humane Learning," *The Christian Scholar*, June 1957, pp. 98-99.

Segregated Fraternities in Our Colleges

JOSEPH MARTIN HOPKINS

A glaring paradox on the current educational scene is the segregated fraternity on the otherwise integrated campus. At many institutions Negroes, Jews, and Orientals are admitted freely to all other phases of college life but are denied membership in the Greek-letter social organizations. Ironically, a majority of undergraduates would gladly open their doors to these minorities but are prevented from doing so by alumni-dominated national hierarchies which are determined to preserve their outmoded tradition of racial snobbery in defiance of the integration trend.

A growing number of racially integrated colleges and universities, recognizing the inconsistency of permitting campus social groups to frustrate their avowed policy of non-discrimination, have insisted that these organizations eliminate criteria of race, color, and creed from their membership requirements. The list of educational institutions which have taken such action is impressive: Amherst, Colorado, Columbia, Dartmouth, Middlebury, Minnesota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the State University of New York, among others. But Church related colleges are conspicuously absent from this list. The denominational schools, committed to the Christian ideal of true fraternity, might logically have been expected to blaze the integration trail. But not only have they failed to pioneer, they have neglected to follow the leadership of the so-called "secular" institutions.

Is it possible that the consciences of state and privately controlled institutions of higher learning are more tender at this point than those of the purportedly Christian variety? Why this reluctance on the part of Church college administrations to provide equality of opportunity for all their students? They cannot argue that it is contrary to policy for them to interfere in the private lives of their students; for they *do* interfere in the areas of drinking, gambling, and sexual immorality. To assert control in these instances but to deny responsibility for racial prejudice — is this to assume that the former evils are more reprehensible than the latter?

It has been argued that tax-supported universities, since they derive the burden of their income from the state, are under legal compulsion to guarantee equal privileges to all students without discrimination. Those defending the inaction of Church colleges contend that anti-discrimination rulings by state university officials have stemmed from political rather than moral motivation. Which is tantamount to saying that Christian imperatives are less binding than those of the state! But it is hardly fair to impute false motives to these officials, many of whom have acted courageously and conscientiously in the face of severe criticism. When the State

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

University of New York outlawed national fraternities in 1953, after vain efforts to counter evasion and subterfuge by national groups making a pretense of conformity, President William S. Carlson justified this measure in these words:

It would be sophistry for the State University to vigorously combat discrimination in its admissions and academic policies and, at the same time, condone these practices among the extra-curricular organizations which it recognizes. The extra-curricular and the academic programs intertwine to such a degree in educating and molding a student that they cannot be severed and each judged by contradictory standards.

With regard to the private colleges and universities which have joined tax-supported institutions on the fraternity integration front, it has been cynically observed that many of these organizations, being heavily endowed, can afford to be more independent in their pronouncements than most denominational schools. The latter, harassed by financial difficulties, must at all costs maintain the good will — and the annual gifts! — of their more affluent alumni, many of whom are diehard fraternity men. The president of a Christian college, it is thus rationalized, wouldn't dare speak forth boldly as did President John Sloan Dickey of Dartmouth in 1948:

This college neither teaches nor practices religious or racial prejudice, and I do not believe that it can for long permit certain national fraternities through their charter provisions or national policies to impose prejudice on Dartmouth men.

Many college administrators, preferring the course of expediency to that of ethics, either remain discreetly silent on the issue or mincingly declare that the fraternities are autonomous with respect to their membership practices. The principle of Christian brotherhood, apparently, is expendable in the interest of harmonious student and alumni relationships.

But some educators, while favoring integration, are not convinced that administrative fiat is the best way to secure it. Brown's position, as delineated in an article by Vincent Heath Whitney, is illustrative of this view:

Discrimination can no more be justified in the University than in any other aspect of American life. The trend of the times is in an opposite direction and barriers to full participation of minority groups are falling one by one. The University will not set deadlines which will attempt to legislate the degree of liberality of its students but it will strongly encourage every fraternity to be "urgent but patient," to take every possible step to alter and to end selective barriers in national constitutions through legal means within the framework of the organization.

This plan of operation looks good on paper; but experience has shown that when reform is left up to the fraternities themselves discriminatory practices usually

SEGREGATED FRATERNITIES IN OUR COLLEGES

remain in force. Alfred McClung Lee, in his penetrating report *Fraternities Without Brotherhood*¹, concluded that

Only where college administrators support the regulation of fraternities can students translate their beliefs into campus-wide accomplishment. Regardless of student interest and activity, effective decisions concerning campus policy rest — by action or default — with the academic administration and ultimately with the board of trustees.

That students, if given ample authority, would eliminate bias practices is indicated by the Elmo Roper 1949 poll of college students, which disclosed that 60 per cent were opposed to any rejection based on artificial criteria of race, color, or religion and that only 20 per cent favored present discriminatory restrictions. The remaining 20 per cent expressed approval of a quota system, limiting minority-group membership to 10 per cent. Commenting on his findings, Mr. Roper explained:

We found that men students felt slightly stronger about this than did women students. And we also found that students in the Far West had a more liberal attitude than students in any other part of the country. But, significantly, there wasn't a single section of the country, including the South, where a majority of students wanted fraternities restricted.

Lee's investigation of the nation's 125 leading fraternity colleges (those having 12 or more fraternity chapters) led him to observe that college administrations generally have been reluctant to take action even when requested to do so by students. At Michigan, for example, the administration vetoed a student-faculty resolution requesting a deadline for removal of discriminatory barriers. At Westminster College (New Wilmington, Pennsylvania) a petition signed by 33 campus leaders (including 9 of the 10 fraternity and sorority presidents) and endorsed unanimously by both the faculty and the student council invited the trustees to co-operate with students and faculty in studying the problem of Greek-letter discrimination. The petition was denied.

It is naive to suppose that the national fraternities, if given enough time, will accomplish self-integration. The optimistic picture suggested by the caption of an article in *U.S. News and World Report*, "Now It's 'Integration' on Fraternity Row" (November 9, 1956), is misleading. It is true that only 10 of the 61 national fraternities comprising the National Interfraternity Conference and 1 of the 32 sorority affiliates of the National Pan-Hellenic Conference have retained restrictive clauses in their constitutions. But repeated experiences have indicated that this outward conformity is in most cases sheer hypocrisy. Even the *U.S. News* article admits that only 40 or 50 Negroes have been integrated into formerly all-white fraternities. According to Lee, although discrimination "has disappeared from formal documents, Aryanism has not died out; in most cases it is very much alive even though underground."

¹Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

Many nationals, while outwardly modifying their membership criteria under duress from college and university administrations, are perpetuating snobbishness and bias through unwritten tacit agreements. This statement by an undergraduate at the University of Missouri is a case in point: "No by-law of our fraternity prohibits our admitting specific persons, but precedent does; and precedent says that we don't admit a Chinese, Jew, or Negro."

But although a number of fraternities have made overt concessions while secretly continuing discriminatory practices, the National Interfraternity Conference has maintained an attitude of open defiance. In its July, 1954, meeting, the executive committee of the NIC condemned interference by college administrations and adopted unanimously a resolution which stated in part that "more unified action, such as the withdrawal of all charters at an institution, may be necessary or desirable as a means of self-preservation." By 1954, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, 40 chapters had been suspended or withdrawn by their national organizations. Since that year others have been dropped, the most recent (September, 1957) being the Amherst chapter of Theta Xi — the fourth fraternity chapter at that institution to be suspended by national officers following the pledging of a Negro.

Efforts of individual chapters to alter national policy are in most cases discouraging, if not altogether futile. In 1954 the Westminster College chapter of Alpha Sigma Phi instructed its delegate to the national convention to campaign for the elimination of the fraternity's restrictive clause. The motion for integration was snowed under by a 51-3 vote. In 1956 the Alpha Nu chapter again petitioned the national for change; but again the integrationists could muster only 3 votes. The following spring an official from national headquarters, during a routine visit, announced expansion plans calling for the formation of a number of new chapters on southern campuses. The implications of this announcement were unmistakable. A fraternity officer during undergraduate days and faculty adviser during recent years, I tendered my resignation to the executive secretary, explaining, "I personally am not content to sit idly by while present and future generations of minority-group students continue to suffer discrimination at the hands of a vestigial racism imposed upon our students by off-campus 'fraternal' organizations."

It is clear, then, that national fraternities generally are in no mood to abandon their tradition of snobbish exclusionism. Reform efforts by individual chapters have been thwarted, and acts of defiance have resulted in prompt expulsion. But whereas a number of chapters have surrendered their charters rather than knuckle under to national discriminatory demands, many more, while sympathetic with integration, have hesitated to go this far. Some find their hands tied by house mortgages which are held by the national office. Others simply feel that the severing of national ties would result in loss of campus prestige, and that the continuing "local" would be seriously handicapped in competing for pledges against big-name national fraternities which have not paid the price of conscience.

SEGREGATED FRATERNITIES IN OUR COLLEGES

These groups need encouragement more than criticism. It would be unnecessary for any individual sorority or fraternity chapter to "go it alone" if students and administration would agree upon campus-wide removal of exclusive practices. When Christian college administrators realize how un-Christian is the anomaly that Jesus Christ Himself, being a Jew, would be ineligible for membership in the white "Christian" fraternities, then perhaps they will act. The question resolves itself to this: upon whom does the responsibility for effecting decisions governing educational policy and student conduct ultimately devolve — the college administration or the transient undergraduate fraternity men?

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ARTICLES

William Ernest Hocking, **Fact, Field and Destiny: The Inductive Element in Metaphysics.**

James F. Anderson, **Some Disputed Questions on our Knowledge of Being.**

James O. Nelson, **Knowledge of Remote Existence.**

Clive Ingram-Pearson, **Our Knowledge of Things in Themselves.**

CRITICAL STUDIES

A. Boyce Gibson, **Plato and After.**

H. S. Harris, **Hegelianism of the 'Right' and 'Left'.**

John Wild, **Weiss's Four-Fold Universe.**

David L. Miller, **Sinnott's Philosophy of Purpose.**

David Braybrooke, **The Expanding Universe of Political Philosophy.**

EXPLORATION

Andrew J. Reck, **The Philosophy of Andrew Ushenko: II.**

BOOKS RECEIVED

Robert Tredwell and Staff, **Summaries and Comments.**

ANNOUNCEMENTS INDEX

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Religion as a Goad to Philosophy

ALBUREY CASTELL

I

During the last quarter-century or so there has been a marked increase in undergraduate interest in the things of religion. This is in part an intellectual interest, a desire to know more about religion, a desire to overcome "religious illiteracy." Courses, programs, departments have blossomed where none grew before. Back in the twenties the undergraduate attitude toward the things of religion ranged from indifference to hostility. Today it does not. It ranges from respectful curiosity to genuine concern. It used to be considered smart to have an attitude toward the things of religion which was compounded of Lucretius and Lucian and Hume and Voltaire and Anatole France and Freud. Today it is not. It used to be considered that only the weak students planned their undergraduate work with a view to proceeding to seminary. Today this is no longer the case.

I do not know what has brought about this change. But I do know that it enables a department of philosophy to offer a course in the philosophy of religion and expect the course to pay its way. To the degree that an undergraduate's interest in philosophy is parasitic upon his interest in something else, you have a situation which departments of philosophy do well to explore. They want philosophy to play a wide role in the life of the college. Now philosophy makes it most effective contact by way of those matters upon which its customers have deep and lively concern. You cannot secure a hearing for philosophy of science or philosophy of art among students who profess indifference or hostility to science or art. It is sometimes said that they must first know some science or some art; and indeed they must. But it goes further than that. They must feel genuine concern. Given just knowledge of a certain matter to work with, the attempt to get people to think philosophically about that matter may die on the vine. The reason, I suppose, is to be found partly in the fact that when you invite a student to think philosophically, you invite him to do something which he finds to be difficult and confusing. He finds it so because it confronts him with ideas which are abstract and general. If he has no deep and lively concern to start with, he has given no hostages to fortune. You may find him cancelling out or memorizing your notes or wondering why he ever took the course in the first place. Your efforts to interest him in philosophy have begun to encounter failure. This is what I meant when I said that an undergraduate's interest in philosophy is frequently parasitic upon his interest in something else.

Most people need to be "goaded" into philosophy, even after they have enrolled for a course. A department therefore wants to know what "goads" it has at its disposal. Science is one such goad: we speak readily enough of "the philosophy of science." But there are others. In the sense in which science can be a "goad to philosophy," one can speak also of morals, politics, history, art, education, as

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RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

goads to philosophy. You can add religion to this list. From involvement in these areas of human concern a man can find himself goaded into philosophical conversation with himself or with another person similarly circumstanced. Among the goads to philosophy it seems to me that science and religion and morals have been the most potent. To the degree that a person is goaded into philosophy by involvement in these matters, you have to say that his interest in philosophy is parasitic upon his interest in them.

When I was an undergraduate the phrase "philosophy of," in such phrases as "philosophy of science" or "philosophy of art," did not occur in our studies and conversations. We spoke of the philosophy of Plato or the philosophy of Kant but rarely of the "philosophy of" some particular field of human interest or activity. We spoke of metaphysics and epistemology, of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, but these were thought to have subject-matters of their own. We spoke of "types" of philosophy, e.g., materialism, idealism, realism, pragmatism, and these "isms" were sometimes thought to carry possible commitments with respect to such matters as science or art or religion, but they were not thought of as "philosophies of" such matters. The phrase, "philosophy of," has in recent years become more modish. For a time I regarded it with suspicion. It seemed to me a way of raiding philosophy on the part of persons who were not "really" philosophers or who had not come up the hard way — a species of academic gate-crashing. But experience is inclining me to believe that while this is sometimes so, it is not always so. The term is loosely used upon occasion, as when one speaks of the "philosophy of" something which seems not strong enough, not vital enough, not autonomous enough, to sustain its own "philosophy of." But this loose usage is not necessary. There are matters which can generate and sustain "philosophies of" themselves; I have mentioned science, morals, history, education, law, art. Religion is also a case in point. I am convinced that it makes sense to speak of the "philosophy of" religion.

II

Whatever we may decide the task of philosophy of religion to be, I would like to suggest four things which it is not.

(1) Its task is not to propound or teach religion. This is not an exhortation to indifference but to neutrality. Its task is not to make converts in the sense of converting people to religion. Its task is certainly to make converts in the sense of converts to philosophy. But I do not think that a *convert* to philosophy of religion is therefore a *divert* from religion any more than a convert to philosophy of science or art is therefore a divert from science or art. I see no reason that conversion to "philosophy of" something must mean disenchantment with regard to that something. I would like to make sure that we understand each other on this point. The task of philosophy of religion is not to teach religion. In the sense in which I am accustomed to use the word "teach," I doubt that you can teach religion. To be sure, you can teach *about* religion, but that is not the same thing as teaching religion.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

To teach a person about religion is to liquidate his ignorance about religion. In this enterprise philosophy can lend a hand.

(2) The task of philosophy of religion is not to "debunk" religion, not to disillusion with regard to religion. I do not mean that it should make no difference in the way a man holds to his religion. I think that philosophy of science and philosophy of art make a difference in the way a man holds to science or art. But I have seen no reason, in their cases, to diagnose this difference as disillusionment. I think we have here one mark of a subject able to generate and sustain a "philosophy of" itself: namely, that to think philosophically about it shall not mean to think less of it.

(3) Philosophy of religion should not be confused with history of religion nor with the comparative study of religion. It may be that some knowledge of the history of religion or some knowledge of different religions is useful to philosophy of religion. On this point my mind is not made up. It may be that knowing one religion well, in the sense of believing in it and living by it, is more useful to philosophy of religion. If the essence of religion is contained only in its historical development or manifested only in its numerical diversities, then historical and comparative knowledge is essential to philosophy of religion; but essential or not, it should not be confused with philosophy of religion.

(4) The task of philosophy of religion is not to exhibit the "place" of religion in some so-called philosophical position. The sort of thing I am seeking to rule out is most easily exemplified in the case of metaphysical idealism. Frequently when I read what metaphysical idealists write about religion, I feel that their primary concern is to show the "place" of religion in their "philosophy," to show where and how they "fit it in" alongside other matters such as science or art. This seems to me to get the cart before the horse. I don't think the job is to have a "philosophy" and then to see where religion "fits into it." You want to discover what philosophy there is in religion. To get at the philosophy of religion is to get at something which is already in religion. You may have here one mark of a subject able to generate and sustain a "philosophy of" itself, namely its autonomy — it is not a "part of," not "dependent on" or "derived from" anything else. It is its own man. Science and art seem to me to possess this kind of autonomy. To ask "What has materialism to say about science?" or "What has idealism to say about art?" seems to me to be no more sensible than to ask what these "isms" have to say about religion.

III

To get at the philosophy of religion is to get at something which is already in religion. What does that mean? What is a person trying to do when he is working out his "philosophy of" a certain matter, say science or art or education or history or religion? I would suggest at least three lines of inquiry which are being attempted: (1) you are trying to diagnose which concepts are basic in your thinking and doing; (2) you are trying to diagnose what first principles are active in your

RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

thinking and doing; (3) you are trying to diagnose what presuppositions are ultimate in your thinking and doing.

What concepts are basic in science, in art, in education, in history? This question sets the problem for the philosophy of those matters. (I use the word "concept" in the sense of "grasper." It is derived from a Latin word meaning grasp or seize.) What do these basic concepts enable you to grasp? Do these concepts form an implicative set or are some independent of others? What principles are active in the selecting and rejecting which goes on when you are "sciencing" or "arting" or "historizing" or "educating?" Principles are active when we discriminate and evaluate. When you are carrying on as a scientist or artist or historian or pedagogue, what principles guide you? Is there one principle and a set of derivatives? Or more than one principle? If the latter, how do they get on together when there is trouble in the family? A principle is not the same as a presupposition. The distinction could be illustrated by these two questions: (1) On what principle do you distinguish between right and wrong? (2) When you criticize a person for wrongdoing, do you presuppose that he could have done otherwise? It is one thing to speak of the principles of, say, scientific thinking, and another to speak of the presuppositions of scientific thinking.

When you speak of the "philosophy of" something, you mean the concepts, principles, and presuppositions connected with that thing. It is in this sense I would speak of the philosophy of science or art or history or education. And in this same sense I would speak of the philosophy of religion. If a man says "I am a Christian," it makes sense to ask him, "What *qua* Christian are your basic concepts? What principles guide your thinking and acting *qua* Christian? What presuppositions do you find it necessary to make *qua* Christian?" The kinds of self-knowledge which you are asking him about constitute his "sophia." And provided his heart is in his work, he will cherish his concepts and principles and presuppositions. There will be an element of "passionate concern" in his thinking about him. The "passionate concern" which I discover in myself *qua* pedagogue carries over to the concepts and principles and presuppositions which I seek to formulate when you ask me for my "philosophy of education." I would expect to encounter this note of "passionate concern" in a man's "philosophy of religion." The word "philosophy" is derived from two Greek words, one of which means "passionate concern."

I have made this detour into the term "philosophy of" because I desire to make clear what in my judgment philosophy of religion invites a student to try his hand at. The course says to him "You are familiar with religion or familiar with a religion. Perhaps you are more than familiar. Perhaps you believe in it and live by it. Perhaps it is for you an object of passionate concern. Now, extend and deepen your self-knowledge in this matter. What are your basic concepts here? What principles guide your thinking and acting when you live out your religion? What presuppositions do you find it necessary to make in the name of your religion?"

IV

It is important to bear in mind that this invitation to philosophize is issued to the typical sophomore or junior in an American undergraduate college. He is not Saint Augustine or Saint Thomas or Pascal or Kierkegaard. He is not a candidate for a doctor's degree. He is not headed for graduate work in a seminary. He is not going to write articles for the journals. He is, largely by accident of birth, a Jew, a Catholic, or a Protestant. He is a major in history or psychology or sociology or speech or English or political science or some other department in the college. Or he may be a "pre-professional," planning to go into law or education or medicine or business administration or some other professional school in the university. He may have had no preparatory work in your department and he may take no follow-up courses in your department. All you know about him is that he has seen fit to enroll in your course. You have him on your hands for a quarter or a semester. You have designs upon him. You propose to get him to think about religion, or his religion, with reference to its concepts, its principles, and its presuppositions. Your problem is not religious or philosophical as you get under way. It is primarily pedagogical: how shall you capitalize on his interest in religion to goad him into philosophizing about religion?

You want to get him to extend and deepen his self-knowledge in certain directions. I would mention one or two things which I would not do. I would avoid dealing with the situation "head on." Thus I would not say: "We are to be interested in concepts, principles, and presuppositions. Now what is a concept? And what are your concepts in religion?" With luck you might talk that way at the end of the course; but you do not touch off a person's ability to ferret out his concepts, principles, and presuppositions by telling him to go ahead and do just that. Nor will he fare much better if you cause him to learn the answers to these questions propounded by great thinkers in the past. You may thereby increase his erudition, but it is by no means as sure that you have deepened and extended his self-knowledge. If at the end of your encounter he does not know his own mind any better than when you began but does know the minds of authors you tell him about or have him read, you have flunked the course even though he gets an "A." Be sparing then with your erudition. I would say the same of your powers of dialectical criticism, whether you exercise these upon your hapless student or upon distinguished writers in the field. You are not trying to impress him. You are trying to get him to know himself better in a certain way. Bear in mind that he is new territory to himself. Avoid using words that end in *ism*, such terms as empiricism, rationalism, mysticism, pragmatism, idealism, positivism, nominalism, realism. For you these may be tonic, for him they are toxic. They produce a subtle poison which misleads him into thinking he has extended his self-knowledge when all he has done is add to his academic vocabulary.

You want topics and materials which will keep his mind on religion, indeed on his religion, but in a way that will move him in the direction you have marked out

RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

for him, namely, a clearer understanding of his concepts, his principles, his pre-suppositions. I am going to suggest three topics, three areas of conversation, lecturing, and reading which I have found useful: (1) religious experience; (2) theological belief; (3) ecclesiastical organization. These topics are usable pedagogical wedges. They open things up for self-examination. They lead eventually to scrutiny at the level of primary concepts, first principles, and absolute pre-suppositions.

V

What does your student understand by "religious experience?" Has he ever had an experience which he would designate as a religious experience? What is the content of religious experience? Does he agree with Dean Inge that the primary evidence for the truth of religion is religious experience? Does he find any use for Martin Buber's distinction between religious experience and experience of religion? What can you learn from religious experience? What can you verify by an appeal to religious experience? Does he think that the distinction between veridical and illusory, which applies to so much of our experience, applies also to religious experience? Does he think that other people have experiences which he would designate as religious? How does religious experience differ from other kinds of experience? What in his judgment is the relation between religious experience and theological belief? Does he base his theological beliefs upon his religious experience? Or does he think that his theological beliefs "condition" in some way his religious experience?

I would confront him with two or three of the mystics, e.g., Plotinus, John of the Cross, Teresa, perhaps an oriental. Is that what he means by religious experience? Would he limit it to that? I would have him supplement his reading here with commentary by William James or W. E. Hocking or Professor Stace. I think religious experience is a good first topic because undergraduates are great believers in experience. They are natural born empiricists. They have greater initial interest in religious experience than they have in either theological belief or ecclesiastical organization. I think the mystics are a good first assignment because for most undergraduates they are new and fresh and intriguing and compelling. Undergraduates are predisposed to give them a hearing, to show them greater initial respect and friendliness than they feel toward theologians. I find them inclined to believe that God had more of a hand in the experiences of the mystics than in the reasonings of the theologians or the decision-makings of the ecclesiastics.

I would move from religious experience to theological belief. I would begin with the questions, "What makes a notion theological?" and "What theological notions can the student mention?" I think he should be confronted with a considerable number and variety of theological terms. He does not possess many. They will add depth and range to his feeling for the topic under discussion. Such terms as creation, sin, incarnation, miracle, trinity, eternal, immortal, revelation, prayer, and redemption are already known to him. Add another dozen or so. Does each involve

a reference to the notion of God? Confront him with a brief statement, say up to 30 or 40 pages, of the essentials of Christian theology. How much of this is he aware of as forming part of the Christian tradition? The question here is not how much of it does he accept or reject. It is rather how much of it does he know about? Most undergraduates are theologically illiterate. It does no harm and, so far as I can see, some educational good to liquidate some of this ignorance.

At this point open up the distinction between revealed theology and rational theology. For your student this is the distinction between two sorts of beliefs that differ in respect to their evidence. On behalf of the one he will say that the case rests ultimately on the fact that God has said that it is so. He has revealed it through a man or a book. On behalf of the other he will say that it stands to reason that it is so. You may find these notions of revelation and reason to be crude and unsophisticated; but he doesn't, and for the moment that is what concerns you. In one way or another you are likely to encounter genuine resistance in connection with this concept of revelation. But it is a matter upon which he must be persuaded to tip his hand. It will goad him along the path you have marked out for him.

Where he sits light to revealed theology, he expects much from rational theology. He may have disappointments in store for himself here, but if so, he must discover that fact himself. You want to let him find out what theological beliefs, in his judgment, do or do not "stand to reason." The existence of God, the occurrence of miracle, the immortality of the soul, the communicative character of prayer are almost sure to crop out. Your student will be grateful if you let him clear his mind on these matters. Let him figure out what he believes and why he believes it; and leave him alone while he is trying to do so. You have set him his long-range problem, namely to run down his concepts and principles and presuppositions. He cannot do this job for himself if you do it for him. Depending on your temperament, you will find this part of the enterprise the most exasperating or the most rewarding. Every class in philosophy has its "awkward squad," and the class in philosophy of religion will be no exception. You must remember that Socrates was not only a gad-fly but also a mid-wife.

One way to keep a check-rein on yourself is to distinguish between the central question and ancillary questions. Thus the central question may be "Does it stand to reason that God exists?" "Does it stand to reason that miracles occur?" "Does it stand to reason that a person survives the death of his body?" Keep away from these questions yourself. They are the concern of your student. But there are pedagogically valuable ancillary questions that can be invented to go along with each central question. Their job is to make sure that the student realizes what he is doing when he decides for or against the central question and offers his reasons for his decision. Work at these ancillary questions while he is working at the central question by himself and doing whatever reading you have assigned on that question. I would emphasize this matter of ancillary questions. They are to be thought of as "setting

up" exercises. They invite you to flex intellectual muscles which you may want when you turn to the central question. That is all I would ask of them.¹

There is, I suppose, a place somewhere for the opposition to be heard from. This is a matter upon which I am not so firmly convinced as I used to be. Freud or Hume in what they have to say about religion and theology provide examples of what I mean. Let me take Hume's "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" or his essay, "On Miracles," as cases in point. It will be urged that no handling of rational theology has been done right by if Hume is not given a careful hearing. This is not as clear to me as it used to be. It is not that I would "protect" any American undergraduate from Hume's skepticism. I long ago gave up protecting anybody against anything. My point is partly that on this matter, and on anything else for which his name may stand as a symbol Hume has become the center of a cult, and I am suspicious of cults. My point is partly also that I am not clear about his relevance. A person professes an interest in philosophy parasitic upon his interest in religion. He wants to know what *his* concepts, principles, and presuppositions are in this matter of religion. He wants to know what he himself thinks. Will Hume tell him? Will Hume help him to clarify to himself what it is that he (the student) thinks in regard to the matters mentioned? Where Hume is assigned with a view to altering the student's ideas, he is being used as propaganda. Where he is assigned with a view to enabling the student to learn by contrast what his own views are, the procedure seems to me to be unnecessarily circuitous and time consuming. Where he is assigned because the student is already a skeptic and Hume will make clear the intentions which are already implicit in the student's own thinking, I see the

¹Consider the following questions as ancillary to the central question, "Does a person survive the death of his body?"

Are there any questions on which it is the mark of wisdom to let belief outrun evidence?

Would you get a bigger jolt from discovering that you do or do not survive the death of your body?

On what conditions would you accept or refuse such survival?

Which: (a) We have no evidence for such survival, or (b) We have evidence that there is no such survival.

Would you distinguish between (a) psychological causes of, and (b) logical reasons for, believe in such survival?

Is there any necessary connection between such survival and the existence of God?

Is belief in such survival a presupposition of any other belief?

If such survival is a property of minds, is it a necessary or an accidental property?

We encounter dead bodies. Why do we never encounter dead minds?

Why does ordinary language distinguish between a person and (a) his mind, (b) his body?

"I changed my mind." "I give my body to be burned." To what does the "I" refer?

Why discussion of the central question leads frequently to a discussion of (a) materialism, (b) empiricism. Are those two beliefs (a,b) compatible?

Make a tape-recording of a person reasoning aloud. Play the tape back. Does it do any reasoning? Did it do any learning?

An astronomer is investigating the solar system. There are three sets of processes going on: (a) in his mind, (b) in his brain and nervous system, (c) in the solar system. In what respects do these processes differ? How are they related to each other?

point and go along with it. I am not seeking to rule out the opposition. Far be it from me in these days of touchy academic liberalism to make any such suggestion. My point is that it has ceased to be clear to me that you make most progress in philosophy, as I am proposing that term, by making a fetish out of the opposition. My point is not to defend rational theology or any other kind of theology. My point is that most undergraduates I encounter in philosophy of religion are, or think they are, interested in rational theology as a live alternative to revealed theology. My job is neither to confirm them in their ways nor to get them to change those ways. It is to enable them to get to know what those ways are at the level of concepts, principles, and presuppositions. It is not wholly clear that the opposition is needed to facilitate this enterprise. I have found C. S. Lewis's book, *On Miracles*, and his book, *The Problem of Pain*, more productive of relevant discussion than I have ever found Hume's books to be. Similarly, I think William James more relevant than Freud. There is, I think, more feeling for the heart of the matter in James's notion that in religion we exercise our "will to believe" than in Freud's notion that in religion we are victims of adult infantilism.²

I would move on from religious experience and theological belief to ecclesiastical organization. I would proceed by posing four questions here: (1) Why is a church necessary? (2) As between a church governed from above by a hierarchy and a church in which ultimate control is vested in the congregation, is choice merely a matter of preference? (3) The church is one institution. The state is another. What relation between these two institutions is the student prepared to

²You will encounter the question: Should a person *be* religious if he is to teach philosophy of religion? Should he be well-disposed to religion, rate it as high, as important, as those rate it who are themselves religious? Should it be for him the locus of genuine commitment, of passionate concern? I used to think the answer to this question was "Not necessarily: it is enough if he knows about religion. It is not necessary that he know religion, know it at first hand in the sense in which a person knows religion if he is religious." Indeed you will hear it suggested that, if a man is to get at the philosophy of religion, get at the concepts and principles and presuppositions in religion, he might better not be himself religious. The point would be: if he is himself a man of genuine religious commitment, he has given hostages to fortune, he can no longer be objective, his mind is incapable of the intellectual detachment necessary to philosophizing about religion. This may be so, but I am coming to doubt it; and that for three reasons. First, people don't talk that way about philosophy of science, philosophy of art, philosophy of history, philosophy of education. Why then should they talk that way about philosophy of religion? People don't recommend a man to busy himself with philosophy of science if he thinks science is an illusion, if he is ignorant of science, if he lacks all first-hand experience of what it is to be a scientist. When a person convinces me that he has this sort of external relation to education, I do not recommend him to busy himself with philosophy of education. Second, I notice that people who talk this way, who see nothing paradoxical in an irreligious man trying his hand at philosophy of religion, are usually themselves ignorant of religion or indifferent or hostile to it. If this is so, may they not also have given hostages to fortune? Thirdly, it is possible that a relevant question is being confused with an irrelevant one. It would be relevant to ask "Does a man care for philosophy? Does he have the cast of mind that finds satisfaction in preoccupied itself with questions of basic concepts, first principles, ultimate presuppositions?" If he is indifferent or hostile at this point, he had indeed better stay away from philosophy of

RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

endorse? (4) The church is one institution. The school, or educational system, is another. What relation between these two institutions is the student prepared to endorse? I shall not elaborate these four questions here, beyond saying that, if you come at them by way of time spent on religious experience and on theological belief, they pay their way in the enterprise. They generate instant and lively discussion. The discussion pulls on what has gone before and soon reaches out into politics, education, and social reform. These four questions of ecclesiastical organization catalyze the two topics which precede them. Eventually, with the weight of the other two topics behind them, they raise for most students the question of the "power to endure." Neither religious experience nor theological belief, as topics for discussion, will do this or do it as effectively as ecclesiastical organization. The point is, I suppose, that religions endure as organized enterprises. But however that may be, they do manifest this power to endure. They are old. They have an unusually tenacious hold on life. They possess and repossess astonishing vitality. They have, as few other things have, "the power to endure." Now the question is "Whence this power to endure?" Where do religions come by it? Is the source of this "power to endure" to be sought in a concern on God's part that they do not die out? Or is it to be sought in something in human nature? Or is it to be sought in their truth? Is their "power to endure" to be taken as evidence that they are true? Wherever it comes from, it is there. And it is an excellent peg on which to hang one or two concluding sessions of the course.

VI

Let me remind you, by way of conclusion, that our subject has been religion as a goad to philosophy. I have mentioned three topics: religious experience, theological belief, and ecclesiastical organization. I have recommended them as means to getting an undergraduate to think philosophically about religion. To that end, these three topics are useful goads. If you reflect on religion, you will find that it contains one or more basic concepts, one or more first principles, one or more ultimate presuppositions. The task of philosophy is to ferret these out. Not to know your own mind with reference to such matters is to be naive. Naivete is a form of self-ignorance. Philosophy is the attempt to dispel that recurring quantum of naivete with which each generation begins its life. It addresses itself directly therefore to an important and perennial aspect of *la condition humaine*. There is no great harm in being naive. However, to know your basic concepts, principles, and presuppositions is to achieve sophistication. Philosophy is the attempt to achieve sophistication; not the sort which one displays at a cocktail party but the sort that is required by an alert and criticized point of view. So conceived, it is an essential ingredient in the life of the mind. You could almost say that it is the inner citadel.

religion or "philosophy of" anything else; and particularly stay away from the taxing business of trying to teach it.

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The Beautiful as Symbolic of the Holy

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GRUNEWALD'S CRUCIFIXION

F. DAVID MARTIN

Artists, art historians, critics, laymen, even aestheticians, are convinced that certain works of art in some sense are religious. General agreement even reigns concerning even specific works, such as Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Amiens Cathedral, Michelangelo's "Pieta", Bach's "Mass in B Minor", Grünewald's "Crucifixion" in the Isenheim Altarpiece. It would seem that art or the beautiful can symbolize the religious or the holy. Yet how is this accomplished specifically?

An object that commands "contemplative" or "intransitive" attention because it is intrinsically interesting and expressive¹ may be said to be "beautiful." For contemplative attention to an object to be possible — for sensitive, trained and mature observers — the object must possess aesthetic or sensory quality, form, and content. Sensory quality can only be immediately experienced or intuited and cannot be defined. They [sensory qualities] are in themselves immediately attractive or repugnant to primitive aesthetic sensitivity. For example, the hue, clarity, depth, intensity, or 'value' of a color may be intrinsically satisfying irrespective of the shape or immediate environment of the colored areas. . . .² Objects lacking sensory quality, although they may be noticed for practical or communicative purposes, will fail to attract contemplative attention because they lack intrinsic interest. Objects lacking form will fail to hold attention, for if a part is not inter-related to the other parts and to the total inter-relationship of the whole, meanings disconnected and thus irrelevant to the object as a whole will distract attention. Objects lacking content, that is, the interpretation of some aspect of the values in human experience, will fail to command attention intransitively because the mature mind is a curious mind. Because the curious mind is concerned about truth, content gives, especially when it is believed to be true, an immediate sense of significance that intensifies the aesthetic experience.

Since the major contention of this paper is that some works of beauty have a symbolic significance with respect to the holy, it is necessary to consider briefly the nature of the symbolic function. A sign is a mark, object, or event which has reference. There are three major types of signs: signals, conventional symbols, and

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¹ For the precise meaning of the terms "expressive" and "expression" as used in this essay see the author's "On the Supposed Incompatibility between Expression and Formalism," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (September 1956), p. 94.

² Theodore Meyer Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, p. 6.

natural symbols. A signal invites overt action, whereas a symbol invites consideration. Thus the primary reference of a stop signal is a cue to action, and conditioned reflexes will serve the purpose. The primary reference of a symbol on the other hand is ideational and therefore must be understood. The meaning of a conventional symbol is arbitrarily attached to it by individual fiat or social convention, as in the case of words other than onomatopoeic words. A natural symbol or icon embodies characteristics similar to those of the referent for which it stands; the signfic function is grounded in a resemblance between symbol and referent. "Anything whatever . . . is an Icon of anything, insofar as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it."³ Thus the sound of the word "buzz" resembles the sound of a bee or referent, and because of this similarity the word signifies its referent. The similarity or parallelism between an icon and referent is not necessarily a physical resemblance, although generally this has been the traditional usage. Actually a great many meaning situations cannot be exhaustively analyzed when "iconicity" is restricted to physical resemblance.⁴ For example, the color white in certain contexts may refer to sacredness. Yet the idea of sacredness has no physical properties, and therefore the reference of whiteness to sacredness cannot depend upon physical resemblance. It can be argued that the reference is simply a matter of convention, but this is not a complete explanation because it fails to explain why white is chosen for such conventional usage in many disparate cultures.⁵ Muddy brown has never been used to refer to sacredness, and these facts suggest that underneath heavy accretions of conventional symbols lies an iconicity dependent upon psychosocial factors not yet clearly understood. Thus whiteness causes an emotive response resembling the emotive response to the idea of sacredness, and this similarity in the psychological responses rather than in the physical aspects of the symbol and referent accounts for the origin of the meaning function. "Iconicity" will be used in the following analysis to include not only physical parallelism between icon and referent, but also the parallelism of emotive responses to icon and referent. The former will be called a "physical icon" and the latter will be called an "emotive icon."

The less intrinsic interest conventional symbols possess the more likely the success of unambiguous reference, an ideal most nearly achieved with the symbols of mathematics. "A symbol which interests us *also* as an object is distracting. It does not convey its meaning without obstruction. . . ."⁶ Natural or iconic symbols may also have little intrinsic interest, as in the case of this stickman †. However, when the iconic character is vividly embodied in the symbol, intrinsic interest is aroused,

³ *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce*, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932, Vol. 2, p. 143.

⁴ I owe this idea to my colleague, Professor Jerome Richfield.

⁵ See, for example, Charles Hartshorne's *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 170.

⁶ Suzanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, p. 61.

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

for attention must be centered on the symbols themselves if their meaning is to be experienced. Beautiful objects possess this kind of iconicity.

The precise manner in which iconicity functions in any major work of art is usually very complex. Thus in the "Crucifixion" by Grünewald⁷ the figures and objects, for example a man and the cross, are physical icons of shape or diagrams. Their shapes are parallel (isomorphic) to the shapes of their referents, and thus signify or suggest these objects and associated meanings. The cross, however, is in addition a conventional symbol, for meanings have been attached to it by the fiat of the Christian Church. These meanings are not natural or iconic; an observer unaware of the Christian tradition would not understand them.

The color white is used only with conventional religious symbols — the loin-cloth of Christ, the robe of the Virgin, the Bible, the lamb, and the inscription on the top of the cross. These symbols refer respectively to sacrifice, virginity, revelation, discipleship, and kingship. The restriction of white to just these symbols deepens the idea of sacredness common to them all. Likewise, the other colors are variously combined with conventional symbols and icons of shape. The pink-flesh color of Magdalene, iconic of sensuality, by contrast enhances the spiritual values of the white. The unearthly greenish tonality of the landscape gives to this spiritual-secular (white-pink) contrast added tragic seriousness. These colors are emotive icons of quality, arousing emotions resembling the emotions aroused by their referents — sacredness, sensuality, and tragedy.

Christ is much larger than the other figures, especially the tiny Magdalene. In nature and human relationships the scaling of sizes may imply the idea of power. The scaling in the picture parallels this kind of relationship and symbolizes — by an emotive icon of power — the idea of the power of the divine over the finite.

Interwoven with these various kinds of symbols are emotive icons of structure. For example, the cross is placed slightly to the right of the visual center of the picture and the body of Christ is on the right side of the cross. The tension of this off-centerness charges the otherwise inert body of Christ with dynamic specified by suggesting the idea of the life-restoring power of the divine, further specified by the outstretched fingers of Christ appealing to God — the implied source of light in the picture. The distorted finger of the Baptist, electric in intensity, seems caught and stretched by the divine current, as is the body of Christ. These icons of structure primarily refer to relationships between parts of a work of art, whereas icons of shape primarily refer to the individual figures and objects. The distinction is one of degree, since in the dynamic context of the aesthetic experience as controlled by the work of art all symbols should be completely integrated.

⁷ Color reproductions of Grünewald's "Crucifixion", centerpiece of the Isenheim Altar, may be seen in *The Sixteenth Century*, edited by Lionello Venturi (Editions d'Art Albert Skira, 1956) and in the March 28, 1951 issue of *Life Magazine* which includes the entire altarpiece and other work of the artist. The original polyptych altarpiece of nine paintings now stands in the Musée d'Unterlinden at Colmar, Alsace.

Iconicity is a less obvious relationship than might at first appear. In the first place, the degree of likeness necessary for an icon to signify is not a function simply of imitative accuracy but involves the characteristic aspects or perspectives. A Mexican sombrero seen from directly above suggests a doughnut more than a hat. Yet it is a faithful reproduction obtainable photographically from a third floor hotel window. Secondly, an icon is always presented in a context or environment that partially controls the reference. In Degas' *Millinery Shop* the above-mentioned shape probably would signify a lady's hat, whereas in Grünewald's *Crucifixion* the iconic reference, if present at all, probably would be to halos.

The governing content of Grünewald's picture and thus the context which controls the reference of every icon within it is the holy. The picture as a totality is a symbol of the holy. Religious art is marked off from non-religious art on the basis of whether or not the holy is the governing content. This is usually recognized by most critics although often without explicit awareness of its basis. Moreover, the demarcation line between religious and non-religious art cannot be drawn sharply. Religious art is more than the presentation of religious stories and conventional symbols. The holy may be expressed without them, although this is not generally recognized. In any case, Grünewald's *Crucifixion* is universally accepted as a work of religious art. If we can understand how the holy is symbolized here, a basis for generalizations concerning less clear examples will be established.

What is meant by the "holy"? Everyone familiar with William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is impressed by the amazing diversity of religious beliefs. Yet even the "pluralistic" James was able to find a common nucleus. It consists of two parts: 1.) An uneasiness; and 2.) Its solution.

1. The uneasiness, reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is *something wrong about us* as we naturally stand. 2. The solution is a sense that *we are saved from the wrongness* by making proper connection with the higher powers.⁸

The holy is the higher power or powers, and holiness is the manifestation of the holy. The holy is believed to be real, "more real" than the reality of secular experience. To make "proper connection" with the holy requires a sense of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher) or ultimate concern (Tillich). "The secular is the realm of preliminary concerns. It lacks ultimate concern; it lacks holiness. All finite relations are in themselves secular. . . . But . . . the holy embraces itself and the secular. . . . Everything secular is implicitly related to the holy. . . . Everything has the dimension of depth, and in the moment in which the third dimension is actualized, holiness appears."⁹

⁸*The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: The Modern Library, 1936, p. 498.

⁹Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 218. Also pp. 11-12: "Ultimate concern is the abstract translation of the great commandment: 'The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart,

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

Ultimate concern reflects man's existential anxiety about his finitude and the precarious nature of all his secular values. This anxiety presupposes, as the condition of its being sensed at all, an awareness of an infinite reality — at least unlimited in some respects — too vast and mysterious for perfect human understanding. Mystics claim experiencing the holy apart, an experience *sui generis*, but for most men the holy is experienced as the transcendental dimension enmeshed somehow with secular value — as the infinite support underlying, justifying, and transcending the inevitable tragedy such experiences as suffering, meaninglessness, guilt, and death. Ultimate concern is the subjective reaction of man either to his immediate awareness of the holy or to his awareness of the final futility of all secular value.

The holy, perhaps, is most usually experienced as the depth dimension of the moral or good, but the mystery of infinity has often been felt to be a part of beauty and truth. Thus Einstein: "The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious side of life. It is the deep feeling which is at the cradle of all true art and science. In this sense, and only in this sense, I count myself amongst the most deeply religious people."¹⁰

The mysteriously transcendent character of the holy, Otto's "the numinous," places the holy partially beyond rational categories.¹¹ The numinous is experienced as "mysterium tremendum": ". . . the hushed, trembling, and speechless humility of the creature in the presence of — whom or what? In the presence of that which is a *Mystery* inexpressible and above all creatures."¹² Nevertheless, the numinous is an objective datum, and the numinous experience or "mysterium tremendum" has describable characteristics related to corresponding properties of the numinous object. For example: corresponding to the wrath and terribleness of the numinous are such emotions as awefulness, fear, dread. The majesty and glory of the numinous causes abasement, humility, "creature-feeling." The urgency or energy of the numinous excites zest, will, impetus. The numinous as "wholly other" or transcendent strikes man with wonder, stupor, absolute amazement. As mystery the numinous fascinates, ravishes, transports.¹³

and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength.' The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary." Contrast the lack of ultimate concern in the following statement by Renan: "St. Augustine's phrase: 'Lord, if we are deceived, it is by thee!' remains a fine one, well suited to our modern feeling. Only we wish the Eternal to know that if we accept the fraud, we accept it knowingly and willingly. We are resigned in advance to losing the interest on our investments of virtue, but we wish not to appear ridiculous by having counted on them too securely." Quoted by James, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁰ Albert Einstein, *Comment je vois le monde*, traduit par le Colonel Cros. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1934, p. 7.

¹¹ "The last step that Reason takes is to recognize that there is an infinity of things beyond." (Pascal).

¹² Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Chaps. 4-6.

Yet the holy undergoes a continuing process of rationalization and moralization. "To get the full meaning of the word 'holy' . . . we must always understand by it the numinous completely permeated and saturated with elements signifying rationality, purpose, personality, morality."¹⁴ "Almost everywhere we find the numinous attracting and appropriating meanings derived from social and individual ideals of obligation, justice, and goodness. These become the 'will' of the numen, and the numen their guardian, ordainer, and author. More and more these ideas come to enter into the very essence of the numen and charge the term with ethical content. 'Holy' becomes 'good,' and 'good' from that very fact in turn becomes 'holy,' 'sacrosanct'; until there results a thenceforth indissoluble synthesis of the two elements, and the final outcome is thus the fuller, more complex sense of 'holy,' in which it is at once *good and sacrosanct*."¹⁵ Religious revelations, dogmas, sacraments, and symbols invariably have their conceptual elements. Theologies of the theistic type and often philosophies attempt to give completely intellectualized accounts of the holy. Yet the holy can never be "spun out" as a theorem within a theological or philosophical system. A religion and a system may say much the same thing about the holy, but the numinous quality of the religious experience cannot be expressed systematically.

Similarly, a work of art that lacks expression of the numinous is not religious, for without the numinous the holy disappears into the cognitive-aesthetic-moral realm of the secular. That is why much of the so-called religious art of the Renaissance, for example most of Raphael's Madonna pictures, is not religious despite its use of religious stories and conventional symbols. The age tended to be too humanistic, rationalistic, and confident to provide the kind of setting that leads to sensitivity to the numinous aspect of the holy. The holy is not just another object among objects, but an Object beyond all other objects that commands awe, humility, reverence. If the holy is expressed, ultimate concern, as the subjective reaction to the holy, may be expressed explicitly or in any case implicitly.¹⁶ Finally, there may be expressed the attempt of man, as an ultimately concerned subject, to understand the holy and his relation to it through conceptual mediation.

Since in Gr newald's "Crucifixion" the holy, ultimate concern, and conceptual mediation are all explicitly expressed, its religious content is universally recognized. The transcendent mystery of the holy is expressed through the numinous, the effect of the holy on man is expressed through ultimate concern, and man's conceptual mediation or attempt to understand and relate himself to the holy is expressed through the conventional religious symbols.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁶ For Tillich ultimate concern has an ontological basis and is not a psychological or subjective counterpart of the numinous (*Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, p. 214), nor is ultimate concern co-extensive with the numinous (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13). I am using the term in the narrower or psychological sense as more fruitful for the purpose of this analysis.

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

The numinous is expressed through such symbols as the emotive icons of structure previously described,¹⁷ the transcendent power of the divine transfiguring the scene. There is an unearthly terribleness expressed in this power, and with it a sense of numinous mystery. But the most essential condition for the expression of numinous mystery in the beautiful is the presence of the inexhaustibility of unrealized possibility.¹⁸ The beautiful is more than the "physically given" object. Immanent in the "given" of any work of art are possibilities suggested to the imagination that are fulfilled or realized physically elsewhere in the work. Thus a chord based on the dominant suggests and anticipates the possibility of the tonic chord. The perception of form in the beautiful depends upon this kind of anticipation and realization. Also immanent in the beautiful are possibilities only suggested and not physically realized. These unrealized possibilities, if through contrast they intensify the realized possibilities, are the source of the richness and intensity of the aesthetic experience. In Grünewald's "Crucifixion", for example, the significance of the off-centerness of the cross and Christ can be felt only if the unrealized possibility of "centerness" is imaginatively conceived and contrasted.

Every work of art must contain unrealized possibilities, but with great works of art unrealized possibilities apparently are inexhaustible. Thus we return to a masterpiece time after time, even after we have achieved complete comprehension of the physically realized object, and discover endlessly new potentialities. This unlimited character of "what might have been," involving the "whole" of a masterpiece, may be called an emotive icon of inexhaustibility. Such an icon suggests incomprehensibility, mystery, and infinity analogous to the sublime¹⁹ and arouses in us emotions analogous to the emotions aroused by the idea of the numinous. Through this parallelism of emotive effects the icon of inexhaustibility symbolizes the numinous. Masterpieces that are patently non-religious, because they lack other factors symbolizing the numinous, nevertheless are often felt to express an aspect of the numinous. When, however, the icon of inexhaustibility is combined with other symbols expressing the numinous, ultimate concern, and conceptual mediation, the icon of inexhaustibility functions as the necessary condition of the successful expression of the holy, the skeletal framework for the other symbols. Without these other symbols, this framework might suggest the bare infinity of, let us say, mathematics, rather than the infinitude of the holy.²⁰ Without this framework, the incomprehensibility

¹⁷ This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, the source of the light in the picture appears to be coming from great height. The suggestion of God in a high place is a factor in expressing the numinous component. For an excellent study of height and light as symbols of the numinous, see Edwyn Bevan, *Symbolism and Belief*, Chaps. II, III and IV.

¹⁸ "Unrealized Possibility in the Aesthetic Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 52, No. 15 (July 1955).

¹⁹ Cf. Otto's point: "In the arts nearly everywhere the most effective means of representing the numinous is the sublime." *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 68.

²⁰ It is interesting to note, although the point cannot be developed here, that the more radically particular and in this sense finite work of art, the more unrealized possibilities it is likely to suggest. Significant unity in a work of art demands significant individuality in the parts,

of the holy is not adequately suggested. Religious art demands masterpieces. Anything less seems unworthy and unsuccessful in a way not so clearly demanded by other kinds of content. It is the icon of inexhaustibility above all other factors that accounts for the numinous character of Grünewald's "Crucifixion."

The expression of ultimate concern, for anyone who has experienced this painting, needs little comment. The hushed inward sorrow of the fainting Mary, the contrasting overt terror of John, the utter humility and awe of the kneeling Magdalene are magnificently expressive of the absolute dependence of preliminary concerns upon the holy. This is a grief that can have only the holy as its object.

Complementing the expression of ultimate concern by the group on the left stands the quiet Baptist on the right symbolizing conceptual mediation. The Latin inscription behind the distorted finger and hand of the Baptist reads: *Illum oportet crescere, me autem diminui* ("He must increase, but I must decrease," John 3: 30). The Baptist, compared to the group on the left, is relatively detached from the Crucifixion, as of course he was historically. The Bible, the Latin inscription, the lamb, and the chalice are closely associated with the Baptist on his side of the cross. These symbols are heavily overlaid with conventional meanings of Christian theology expressing the attempt of man's reason to understand the holy. The divine becomes the Logos. The expression of ultimate concern and conceptual mediation fuse throughout the picture, as in fact they usually do in the religious experience, but the dominance of ultimate concern on the left and conceptual mediation on the right is one of the reasons for the dynamic balance of the totality. Without the numinous, the grief of the group on the left would be that of a finite tragedy, and the conceptual mediation would lack the necessary transcendental reference.

The expression of the numinous aspect of the holy is the *sine qua non* of all religious art, of the beautiful as symbolic of the holy. When the numinous is directly and powerfully expressed, ultimate concern is implied even when it is not directly expressed. El Greco's "View of Toledo" contains no living being to express directly ultimate concern, yet El Greco's concern, the observer's concern, all mankind's concern is understood. The numinous character of the architecture of Amiens Cathedral — excluding everything that directly expresses ultimate concern, like the awe-struck figures in some of the windows — implies the "I am nought, Thou art all."

Conversely, the numinous may not be directly expressed and yet be implied when ultimate concern is directly and powerfully expressed. Thus Rouault's clowns are sometimes taken to be Christ. Thus Thomas Wolfe, who despite his insatiable curiosity never seemed aware of the holy or religion, indirectly expressed the

and this accounts for the uniqueness of every work of art. Hamlet's individuality makes the possibilities open for his actions far more extensive than the less individualistic Othello. There may be some connection here with Tillich's argument that "... the holy needs to be expressed and can be expressed only through the secular, for it is through the finite alone that the infinite can express itself." *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, p. 218.

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

numinous through his growing sensitivity to the absolute precariousness of all secular values.²¹ At the very end of his last work, *You Can't Go Home Again*, he explicitly expressed the numinous in the most beautiful lyric he ever wrote:

"To lose the earth you know, for greater knowing; to lose the life you have, for greater life; to leave the friends you loved, for greater loving; to find a land more kind than home, more large than earth . . . Whereon the pillars of this earth are founded, towards which the consciousness of the world is tending — a wind is rising, and the rivers flow."

Conceptual mediation is religiously meaningless, as in Parmigianino's *Madonna Della Rosa*, unless the numinous is either directly expressed or implied through ultimate concern. Within the context of the numinous, however, conceptual mediation, as in Grünewald's "Crucifixion," may strengthen the expression of the holy. When either the numinous or ultimate concern is explicitly symbolized, there seems to be an inevitable need for the expression of some kind of conceptual mediation, for example, Eliot's movement from the ultimate concern of his early works, such as *The Waste Land*, to the inclusion of conceptual (theological) mediation in his later works, such as the *Four Quartets*. Conceptual mediation is not necessarily theological. The twentieth-century artist, when he expresses conceptual mediation at all, is more likely to derive his concepts from philosophy, as Mann did in *The Magic Mountain*, or he may avoid obvious systematic derivation entirely by reliance upon myth, as Joyce in *Finnegan's Wake*, or seem to rely upon common sense, as Warren in *All The King's Men*.

But most modern artists cannot find any kind of conceptual mediation. They are too lacking in confidence in human reason and too disdainful of past solutions. Kafka's *The Castle* expresses explicitly both the numinous and ultimate concern, but there is no conceptual mediation. Indeed, for Kafka the tragedy of existence is that conceptual mediation is impossible and yet man cannot help seeking it. The old theologies and mediations are unacceptable and no substitute seems to be available. This is the religious dilemma of modern man and thus of the modern artist. But this does not make his work necessarily non-religious. Too much confidence in conceptual mediation takes the numinous out of the holy and the ultimacy out of concern, as happened in much of the so-called religious art of the Renaissance. Lack of confidence in reason, at least to some degree, is the prerequisite for sensing the numinous and experiencing ultimate concern.

The sensitive artist of today cannot help experiencing the precariousness of secular values, the doubt about the capacity of reason to solve man's despair, and the mystery that always seems to stretch beyond man's grasp. He may deny a conceptual mediation, but he may express the holy in the beautiful through this very denial.

²¹ See the author's "The Artist, Autobiography, and Thomas Wolfe," *The Bucknell Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March 1955), p. 28.

Marks of an Educated Man

KERMIT EBY

I believe that "the educated man is he who can see the consequences of his acts in the sum total of their relationships." The mature man is he who knows what he believes, gets a base in organization, and proceeds to implement his belief.

Now I admit that the two ideas do not permit many combinations. But I insist that two are twice as good as one and much, much better than none at all. The question I ask myself more often than any other is: How did I happen to come to the conclusions aforementioned? I am convinced that the simplest, most determining influence in bringing these conclusions into focus was the world of my childhood and youth. Every personal and institutional experience from age one to twenty-one repeated and stressed that man is put into the world for a purpose, and if God's will is to be accomplished, it is through us.

To this day it would seem that I can escape almost everything in my heritage except this abiding curse. The curse is doubly tragic, for my world is ever so much bigger and more complicated than the circumscribed one of my youth. I am the son of Mennonite and Brethren background (sects of withdrawal) thrust into a world in which there is no longer a place or point in time to which to withdraw. No matter how urgently I look for islands, I cannot find any place where the coca-cola machine or the A-bomb had not been before me. Not being able to live in a world which no longer exists, I am driven to create a world more consistent with my memory of that long-ago Brethren life. If I "identify downward," it may be because I was nurtured by a minority group. The Mennonite and Brethren of my youth were the Plain People, the queer people, bearded and solemn. Our language was Pennsylvania Dutch, and I learned my first English in school. In my heritage Caesar was given only the bare minimum necessary. We paid our taxes but seldom voted. We wanted to be left alone to live out our New Testament ethic. I was a minority boy linguistically, culturally, and religiously. As I look back on my grade school days and recall my closest friends, they include Johnny who wasn't very bright, Charley whose parents were Belgian and therefore foreigners, and Norris, the "adopted" son.

Perhaps it was this identification which prompted Malinda Wentz (one of the finest and most creative teachers I ever had) to assign to me the negative in a classroom debate on the pending exclusion acts of 1924. Be that as it may, it was the incident which stimulated my interest in the Orient and influenced my graduate school decision to specialize therein. In graduate school I developed the arguments to support the peace witness of my heritage. I learned among other things that tariffs — particularly the Smoot-Hawley tariff — were more than domestic concerns. And contrary to national opinion, our immigration legislation involved others, particularly Orientals, more seriously than ourselves. Understanding, com-

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MARKS OF AN EDUCATED MAN

plete and terrible, came to me in a traumatic way. In 1933 when I was in the Orient with a Friends' goodwill mission a young and sensitive Japanese asked me to explain why "you in America send us Christian missionaries to teach the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man and deny it in an exclusion act?"

At that moment my definition of the educated man — he who can see the consequences of his acts in the sum total of their relationships — came into focus.

I am supposed to know something about economics. But what I know about economics began with the economics of my father's farming. Dad was born at precisely the right time; he bought our home farm in 1911 for ninety dollars per acre. He paid for it and rebuilt all the buildings by 1918. However, I had an uncle who was not so fortunate. Ten years Dad's senior, he had his first farm paid for in 1918. To buy the second he mortgaged the first, which he promptly lost in 1923 when corn was selling for 10 cents a bushel and pigs for three cents a pound. My father became a model of thrift and prosperity and an example to the young; my uncle ended up a burden to his children.

But while Dad and Uncle Elmer rode the escalators of economic fatality in different directions, Uncle George Phillips went to jail as a C. O. He earned nothing at all while he witnessed for his conviction. I did not quite understand why the Church, which taught pacifism, could not bear the support for its young men as equitably as the government did.

Again, it was Japan that taught me. It was a long discussion on tariffs and population in which the gentle people maintained: "Give us land, and we will grow our own foodstuffs." But the impatient said: "Why did the white race pre-empt everything worth taking, and then join the church of the status-quo?"

Perhaps no single experience came home to me more deeply than the solution of the problem of mass unemployment. Remember that in spite of every effort of the New Deal 19,000,000 were unemployed in 1939. Then came September 3, the same year, Adolph Hitler marched into Poland. England, realizing her responsibility under a mutual assistance treaty, began to let ordnance contracts. Ordnance stimulated steel. As steel goes, so goes the nation, and the unemployed began to melt away. Lend Lease and Pearl Harbor did the rest. By the end of 1941 there was a shortage in the labor market. Nurtured by war or its preparation, we have been (with the exception of May 1950) on an ascending employment spiral ever since.

Neither the Communists, the Capitalists, nor the mixed-economy boys have been able to produce a full employment economy without the stimulation of the arms race. America alone is so rich that it can afford to give its people guns and butter at the same time. The other peoples have their guns at the price of hunger, cold, and fear.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

In 1946 we were attempting to democratize Japan by fiat, and I was a member of the education mission to Japan. I asked my young Japanese interpreter what he had done during the war. "I was a student and then a flyer, training as a Kamakazi." "But the Kamakazi flew only one mission — to their death! Why did you do this?" "To show the white race that, if I could not be equal in life, I could at least be equal in death."

So you see why economics to me can never be a science and why statistics frighten me. For behind the figures there are always men and women, quite often men and women in a bad way. Every time there is a Cicero riot, a Trumbull Park, a Till murder, I cringe. For we who claim so much for our system and way of life must expect that the price of our claims is constant surveillance, constant judgment.

But why must he who knows what he believes get a base and go to work?

I remember the impact of the outside world on our sheltered Mennonite and Brethren islands. I recall two very old newspaper headlines as vividly as if they were bannered only yesterday; "The Titanic Sinks"; "Franz Ferdinand Shot at Sarajevo." Even then I somehow understood that we in Elkhart, Northern Indiana, were not unrelated to both events. It was the sequence which followed the shooting of the Archduke that took our sons to war or to jail, raised the price of our corn and hogs, and brought us Brethren the condemnation of the patriots who daubed our church with yellow paint because we refused to buy war bonds.

I questioned an uncle who was then in college, and he described for me the balance of power, the Great Alliance so delicately balanced that a single shooting of an archduke could plunge the world into war.

For me, high school and college came in their proper order, and books and more books. In between, we debated and spent our weekends talking peace to already converted Brethren congregations, congregations which were becoming more and more involved with Caesar and secularism. By 1924 I knew that if there were another war, the Brethren youth would take their places in uniform. And during World War II only about seven percent of that youth kept the pacifist witness of the church.

I did not find the answers in a Brethren college, so in 1929 I came to the University of Chicago. And here again, although I learned much, I could not find the answers. For I was reminded that I might become a scholar someday, if I would keep reform off my mind. But by 1931 I had landed in Michigan, where I plunged into organization and politics. It was here that I discovered that it was in the implementation of my ideals that I found fulfillment.

The world in which I grew up stressed the sins of omission almost equally with the sins of commission. He who failed to provide for his own, failed specifically to pay his debts, to cut his thistles, or to fill his mudholes, was as sinful as he who

MARKS OF AN EDUCATED MAN

committed a positively wrong act. Yet the sins of omission ended with the personal and not the social responsibility. And although we did not like Caesar's war and Caesar's tax, who were we to challenge Caesar's will? And yet increasingly, I believed that we who failed to challenge Caesar's will were as guilty of the sins of omission as the lazy farmer who let his thistles go to seed.

I came to the conclusion that I must attempt to convince my friends, my church, and ultimately Protestantism, of the necessity of working for peace as the Brethren originally taught that peace should be. Integrity, peace, and brotherhood. Now one of the ways that this can be brought about is through politics. Therefore I teach that man is a political animal, that politics exists in every institution, that the politician is a catalyst, and that we need to accept politics as one of our first responsibilities.

Since politics in our society is a matter of voluntary as well as involuntary organization, I tell my students that they should find a place in a voluntary organization and work from within the structure. I have accepted the responsibility of power because I insist that decision will be made by someone and that the real choice lies in the value-pattern which the decision-maker brings to the task. And one of my deepest resentments in the CIO was against those who asked self-righteously, "What are you, a Brethren minister, doing in a labor union?" To which I replied, "Not that I'm so good, but that the alternatives are so awful."

Therefore, as a teacher, I want to encourage young people to examine what they believe, get a base, and go to work to advance their belief. It is only step by step and hurdle by hurdle that the good life can be built, and the world of brotherhood and justice achieved by the educated who not only see relationships but act on what they have seen.

Some Should Be . . . Teachers

And his gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers.

— Ephesians 4:11

WILLIAM R. MUELLER

I. The Matter of Education

And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.

— Genesis 1:31

As college and university instructors and professors, the matter of our profession is God's created universe. Our calling is to profess what is true about the earth and the waters, about the firmament, and about all living creatures, their arts, sciences, and institutions. Diverse as our disciplines are — we have among us teachers of art history and agricultural engineering, of English literature and animal husbandry — all of us come under the general classification of educators. The classicists among us will remind us that "to educate" means "to lead from, or out of, something," and as educators we are charged to lead some of those living creatures already mentioned, creatures of a peculiar species known as *in imago Dei*, out of either a void, a horrendous nothingness, or a chaos, a formless mass of misinformation. By the time most of our students reach us, they have been transported from a state of void to one of chaos, and we are called upon to dissuade them from some remarkably imaginative misconceptions, called upon to persuade them that Commodore Dewey was neither a progressive educator nor a governor of New York, that "Lycidas" was not written in memory of Milton's friend and monarch King Edward, that Cain and Abel are not a current cinematic comedy team, that Boyle's Law has nothing to do with the temperature of water and Grimm's Law nothing to do with fairy tales, that Moby Dick was neither a Shakespearean villain nor a cousin of the Rover boys, that Adlai Stevenson did not write *Treasure Island*, and that Sodom and Gomorrah were not an adulterous couple who peopled the earth with a generation of vipers.

Whether we profess chemistry or physics, geography or geology, sociology or psychology, history or economics, literature or art or music, our task is to try to make clear the truth about one aspect of God's world. We may profitably recall Monsieur Jourdain, that entertaining character from Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who undertook the formal study of language in his adulthood and was

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SOME SHOULD BE . . . TEACHERS

amazed to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life. Let us not wait until we are professors emeriti to make the thrilling discovery that the matter of our profession is God's own handiwork, from the earthworm to the harmonious music of the celestial spheres. We may learn from the Psalmist that "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof, the world and those who dwell therein," and we may know that that which is the Lord's is all-inclusive. Whether our matter be the nature and structure of the mineral kingdom, the vegetable kingdom, the animal kingdom, or the highly complex human kingdom with its social institutions, its scientific hypotheses, its metaphysical postulates, and its artistic achievements, our matter is the Lord's matter.

We are told that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; that He made the light and separated it from darkness; that He separated the waters and the earth; that He caused the soil to bring forth fruit; that He placed the lights in the firmament; that He made the creatures of the sea, the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth; and that, on the sixth day, He made man in His own image. At the end of the sixth day of creation, "God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was good." This goodness, the fall of this goodness, and the redemption of this goodness shapes the matter of education. The matter of our profession, of education, is God's created universe.

II. The Sowing of Education

Son of man, can these bones live? — Ezekiel 1:3

Professing is not without its discouragements, and all of us are tempted occasionally to mutter through our teeth something about pearls and swine; if we are perceptive enough to carry our analogy through to its logical conclusion, however, we will see ourselves as something of an oyster. It is disheartening though, is it not, to face at eight o'clock on some dreary morning what seem to be twenty or so absolutely vacuous and lifeless faces? "Son of man," we ask ourselves despairingly, "can these bones live?" If we are really devoted to life, then it becomes us to try some form of respiration; we might possibly cause breath to enter into what is seemingly the most unpromising and unlikely subject.

We might liken ourselves to the sower who went out to sow. The seeds may fall along the path for some of our students; that is to say, their minds may have become just as hardened as was Pharaoh's heart — they may have unseeing eyes and unhearing ears. For others the seeds may fall on rocky ground; there is an immediate and joyous flurry of response, but the seeds have not taken deep enough root, and the tribulations and persecutions of arduous intellectual discipline are just too much. To sleep or to study, that is the question, but it is a question easily and

quickly resolved in favor of the former. For still others the seeds may fall upon thorns. I shall probably not soon forget one of my students for whom this was so, a sloe-eyed blonde named Millie. September had come and gone, as had October, November, December, January, February, and March — seven months and no sign of life. Millie had sat imperturbably and fixedly, a fascinating cross between the Mona Lisa and the Sphinx; in my spare moments, I placed bets with myself as to whether she or it were flesh or marble. With April came D. H. Lawrence, and the spark was struck; a reading of Lawrence brought her new life — of a sort. I can still remember that gratifying conference. Millie, her exquisitely chiseled frame now pulsing with activity, had dropped in to tell me of her exciting discovery. Lawrence had given life meaning for her, and her every moment thenceforth was to be devoted to him (her next project, she told me feverishly, was to read *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*!); it appeared, indeed, as if Lawrence were to be canonized anew. But the cares of the world and the delight in riches, all centered in fraternity row, were too much. She soon resumed her status as sloe-eyed blonde; the throbbing woman, exhausted and debilitated by her exposure to literature, became metamorphosized once again into a very beautiful and quite dead marble statue.

Some seeds, happy to relate, do fall on good soil, soil which initially may have seemed unfertile. The roots go deep and the yield is great, sometimes a hundred-fold, sometimes sixty, sometimes thirty. The parable of the sower, first narrated by a man who knew the discouragements of teaching, may serve to encourage us. "Son of man, can these bones live?" Strange as it may sometimes seem, they can; and when they do, the day is a joyful one. This is the day for which the teacher lives, the day which assures him that his own bones are nourished with the dew of life.

III. Potter or Horticulturist

*So neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything,
but only God who gives the growth. — I Corinthians 3:7*

Irony came early in the biblical world. The setting was Eden; the time, long ago; the *dramatis personae*, Eve and the serpent. The serpent, bent on the lady's seduction, was effecting all kinds of sleight-of-hand dazzlers and digging well into his bag of tricks. It was too much for Eve when he told her what a grand reward disobedience would bring: "You will be like God." Not only was the promise an irresistible temptation; it was also a fine bit of dramatic irony: it was a true statement, but true in a way quite unforeseen by Eve. At the moment of disobedience, Eve did become like God in that, and only because, she became her own god. Her defiance came at a high price, as she eagerly arrogated to herself the divine prerogatives of will and judgment — "not thy will, but mine," the parody read.

SOME SHOULD BE . . . TEACHERS

Choosing to follow her own will rather than that of Jahweh, she set up a frail and willowy suzerainty, bowing down to herself in suicidal self-idolatry. Most of us like to play god too. We don't even bother to avow our intentions and declare ourselves candidates for the office, don't even write courteous, judicious, inquiring letters of application.

In what ways do we play god as teachers? We do so primarily when we seek to create or re-create our students in our own image; *in imago meo* is so much more lovely and original and gratifying than *in imago Dei*. Or, if our inclination is to be a little more modest, we may content ourselves with trying to mould our students into other shapes and patterns which may suit our fancy. We may turn to them with zealous blasphemy and orate: "Behold, like the clay in the potter's hands, so are you in my hand, O house of English majors." But the potter analogy, if it is applicable any place is applicable with God alone.

The teacher's role is not that of potter but of horticulturist. Paul knew this. When the Corinthians were divided in allegiance, arguing among themselves as to whether they belonged to Apollos or to Paul or to some other Christian teacher, he called them sharply to know the true function of the teacher: "I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the growth. So neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but only God who gives the growth." Knowing our own role, let us repeatedly impress upon our students the fact that, if we are planters and waterers, they are plants and not sponges. A sponge absorbs water, retains it for a while, and then drips it out in a miserably undigested form on a final examination. A plant, on the other hand, is nourished and vitalized by the water, becoming transformed into something precious. When our students leave us, it will be to our shame and their poverty if they file out as blurred carbon copies of ourselves, as globs of ill-wrought clay, or as wizened, shriveled sponges. Let each one be that unique plant which is the realization of his own inner being; let each one be what he was meant to be — himself.

Contemporary Theology and Christian Higher Education

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Higher education is especially important during periods of rapidly changing culture. Then teachers of higher education have a peculiar opportunity to help chart civilization. Major discoveries of fact and decisive new contexts of interpretation eventually remold the basic assumptions for culture. In both manner and intensity our age is exceptionally transitional and consequently open to significant impact from higher education. Our assigned task is to survey and to appraise the field of contemporary theology for its capacity for constructive impact on higher education. Even a sketch can be of value if it highlights what is important; conciseness can gain the power of concentrated focus.

I

Furthest on the right stand the Fundamentalists. A few years ago even mention of this position might have seemed quite irrelevant to the problems of higher education both because of Fundamentalism's external standard of authority and because of its belonging to a bygone era. As far as the first of these liabilities goes, there is always a natural chasm between Fundamentalism and higher education. Fundamentalism accepts literal biblical authority; higher education requires an open inquiry. No cleft was apparent, radically and finally, until scientific method and the historical consciousness showed us that truth separates literalism and open inquiry. No matter what minor concessions to the historic conditionedness of the Bible Fundamentalism might make, because of the nature of its authority its basic position must remain: "We know what we believe; don't confuse us with facts!" But Fundamentalists are changing rapidly. In one of its periodicals, *Christian Life*,¹ a strongly representative group of its forefront young leaders signed an article saying that they no longer want to be called Fundamentalists or to be tied down to a narrow interpretation of inspiration but that they want to be called Evangelicals who make Christ as holy love their final authority. Similarly in *Christianity Today* article after article disclaims obscurantism and calls for an honest facing of intellectual issues. Insofar as this tendency continues we can conclude only that Fundamentalism as a position shows itself less and less tenable to those competently educated. Resurgence to conservative Christianity in our day seems to be accompanied by its maturation. While respecting its devotees in higher education for their intention of integrity and for their loyalty to an intrinsically impossible situation, we must nevertheless maintain that there is no *inherent* relation between higher education and Fundamentalism.

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¹The issue of March 1956. Illustrative of the best offering of this group for higher education is *Christian Education in a Democracy* by Frank E. Gaebelein.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Let it be said, however, concerning Fundamentalism that with regard to its main positive Christian contentions it stands in the solid line of historic Christianity; and it may even be that in the far future we may come to see that liberal accommodationism could not get rid of true evangelical supernaturalism because of the intransigence of Fundamentalism. Therefore we honor it while we recognize that our task goes beyond it: to find a theology that both maintains the heart of the full Christian faith and communicates constructively in give and take with higher education.

II

The theological tendency that is the strongest throughout the world today is Kierkegaardian Neo-Calvinism as represented in different ways and degrees, for instance, by Barth, Brunner, and Torrance. Basically this position is Calvinism as reinterpreted through Barth after his immersion in Kierkegaard and consequent conversion by him from liberalism. Actually through Kierkegaard it is also touched by a strain from Luther as well as by existentialism. This drive differs vitally from other returns from liberalism, as for instance that of P. T. Forsyth who maintained throughout an understanding and appreciation of God's work in human reason, in human conscience, and in the order of creation as a whole which Neo-Calvinism rejects.

Nevertheless, this leading theological position is both right and needful in its main affirmations. It claims at its center that the Christian faith in its biblical position is ultimate and cannot, therefore, be classed as a religion or compared with other religions. In the Bible, focussed and fulfilled in the Christ, God has revealed himself, and only there. This revelation is not a matter of ideas but of God's mighty acts, of saving events. Revelation is not propositional truth. Neo-Calvinism furthermore claims that such faith cannot be verified in terms of reason, experience, metaphysics, or history. The less certain and the less real cannot demonstrate or prove what is absolute and eternal. It proclaims that God is not to be found in man or in nature, for God is "wholly other," eternally different from these, and is in no way part of what is created. Barth has backed away from his own most extreme position in the second edition of *Römerbrief* most markedly by his publication of *The Doctrine of the Word of God* (1927), his book on Anselm, *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (1936), and astonishingly his recent booklet, *Die Menschlichkeit Gottes* (1956). Some of his followers have also become modified "Barthians," but the movement as a whole owes its distinctive nature and power to the emphases we have noted. Throughout the world it is maintaining and in some places gaining strength.

While right and essential in its main contentions, Neo-Calvinism suffers from a false all-or-none analysis. Its primary either-or lacks a secondary both-and. The Christian faith is ultimate; revelation cannot be reduced to propositions; God cannot be proved by anything less than himself; and God is ever other than the creature. Therefore we must ever live by faith in loving obedience. On the other hand Neo-

Calvinism is wrong in its repudiation of reason in its rightful place and legitimate manner. Albeit revelation is a matter of God's self-revelation in events, in history, and supremely in a Person, so that revelation cannot by its very nature be equated with propositional truth; nevertheless revelation must be apprehended, understood, and communicated by means of concepts and propositions. How can people believe unless they have heard and heard the proclaimed word? Barth's theology can perhaps best be called the Theology of the Word, the Word transcending all meaning, surpassing all understanding, and yet also it must be recognized, communicable within and for faith by means of inescapable concepts and sentences.

As for reason's incapacity to prove God, reason does not exist either to create or to establish revelation but to find it, to clarify it, and to apply it. God reveals himself; that is God's part. Man responds to revelation in faith by reason; that is man's part. Revelation and reason are on different planes. One cannot take the place of the other. There is a positive relation between revelation and reason or between reality and man's need. In order to discover this relation man must first decide for and develop integrity of the whole man in actual life and thereafter study as best he can to find what is true and false revelation. In his able *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* Barth goes so far as to accept the inferential use of reason from the basis of revelation. Such acceptance assumes that revelation has a nature that lends itself as a total context for knowledge or to a central focus of perspectives. Beyond this expansion of his standpoint he should have gone on to see that from within this perspective man has the competence, by reason on its own plane, to check and to challenge candidates for revelation and even to be creative in the interpretation of truth. Unless this is so, the cord between revelation and all other truth is cut and we are left with completely arbitrary faith judgments or with a Spirit of Partiality who gives revelation to some and withholds it from others. Man's reason then cannot either create or establish revelation. But reason can help "test the spirits" whether or not they be of God. Similarly by means of experience, history, and nature man cannot prove God, but God's revelation can be self-authenticating in terms of these, providing for us the only true light of what ultimately is, what ought to be, and the road between them. God's revelation through events can therefore provide a meaningful total context for interpreting our existence, values, and aims not only intellectually but especially in terms of judgment and salvation.

Similarly Neo-Calvinism is wrong in its denial of God's presence and revelatory work on the level of creation. Its transcendence does not allow for God's both being himself in a peculiar way and coming into history in his unique Presence while also being present in man and history in a preparatory and pedagogical way. This all-or-none view has too little understanding of the nature of Spirit to remain self-same and yet be capable of different modes of adaptation by means of which God creates and preserves inviolate the conditions for man's self-being and freedom.

The main contribution of this group to higher education is the existentialist grasp that truth in terms of ultimates or of overall contexts is more decisional than

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

informational. It cuts to shreds the pretexts of an objectivist, rationalistic metaphysics or of any system of ethics that fails to see and to heed the fact that there is no presuppositionless thinking and that in matters of total contexts, configurations, and dimensions of knowledge we live more by faith than by knowledge. This genuine and vital contribution we accept gratefully. All-or-none transcendence, however, pulls down the curtain of irrelevance between the Christian faith and higher education. Higher education cannot by field or function deal with revelatory realities within a merely redemptive context. It deals with a world of actualities and problems which it must interpret and on which it must throw concrete light. There must be a real measure of continuity between revelation and education or else they are irrelevantly related. Complete or even basic continuity between them however is not necessary. It is not even possible if revelation is on a different plane from reason.

Neo-Calvinism lacks contextual relevance (in terms of explanation) as well as a relevant standard of judgment. There is no organic relation between revelation, redemption, and creation or between faith and reason that allows for a fruitful exchange between the Christian faith thus interpreted and higher education. Brunner's *Christianity and Civilization* comes the closest to providing a meaningful focus for looking at the problems of civilization and to offering concrete help. But even here he fails to make available a central Christian pattern and to depict overall organic relations. With his comparatively recent acceptance of Agape as the distinctive and determinative motif of the Christian faith he is in position to move into such relevance, but if he does, he will also leave with finality a position of which he is even now only an ambiguous member.

The leading theological tendency of today has sacrificed far too much relational truth to social and religious relativism. When reason is repudiated, the result is relativity among claimed authorities. Therefore there is no basic hope for higher education from Neo-Calvinism. There is much activity within this position and many vital things are being said by its adherents about higher education. But at its heart Neo-Calvinism stands with Fundamentalism in creating an unbridgeable gulf of irrelevance between the Christian faith and higher education.

III

Another movement that has been gaining ground in recent years is the Lund school, the kind of Swedish theology advocated especially by men like Aulén and Nygren. This theological position is best known in America through Gustav Aulén's *The Faith of the Christian Church* and Anders Nygren's *Agape and Eros*.

Nygren shows us how Kant's Copernican revolution of critical philosophy was decisive for consequent thought. Critical philosophy after Kant was seen to deal not with realms of ultimate reality but with principles of validity; not with the region of the transcendent but with the reality of the transcendental; not with a supernatural world beyond this one but with necessities and universalities within experience and

for experience. Critical philosophy deals with the preconditions for experience, those necessities without which experience itself is unthinkable. As unconditional necessities, they are not beyond our realm of experience because they do not exist, nor can they be *in* experience and remain unconditional; they are rather the presuppositions unconditionally *of* and *for* experience. Kant found three such realms of experience: the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic, each with its own kind of transcendental forms. Not all normativeness for experience in his thought therefore was rational, but there were different types of unconditional categories of and for experience. Nygren accepts Kant's position and builds on it. He goes back of Kant's analysis critically to a category of categories, to an ultimate unity of logical necessity, "the category of eternity." The all-inclusive, ultimate presupposition of experience is therefore the religious category of eternity.

This category of the absolute presupposition for experience however is forever inaccessible to rational metaphysics. Reason cannot deal with ultimate reality, only with principles of validity; not with any transcendent realm, but only with transcendental necessity. Therefore according to Nygren's analysis, choice of ultimates must be made from within experience, from the stuff of history. In history choice must be made among religions that are seen to be organic wholes, with centers from which each religion must be understood. Each religion has a regulative pattern, an organic wholeness from a center, a foundational or *Grundmotiv* in terms of which alone its distinctive and determinative nature can be understood. The center of Judaism is *Nomos* or law; of Hinduism, *Karma* or deed (and consequence); of the Christian faith, *Agape* or God's unconditional, spontaneous, uncalculating, groundless Love creative of fellowship, centered not in the worth of the object but in the unceasingly forgiving nature of the Subject, pictured most vividly in the forgiveness of and redemptive love for enemies.

The task of Christian theology according to this method is not to build a system of search for God from experience, not to construct a metaphysics nor an apologetics but to find in history by a faith judgment which is invulnerable to reason the *Grundmotiv* of the Christian faith which actually is *Agape* and to describe the implications of this motif as they have been developed concretely by the faith of the Church throughout its history. Theology according to the Lund school is as objective, scientific, and intellectually acceptable as physics or biology. The theologian never judges what is ultimate truth or reality nor does he ever defend the faith rationally but merely describes it as competently as possible. No concrete confession of faith as such can be proved necessary to history, but faith itself is inescapable. Therefore faith should choose true revelation by the eyes of faith but never make the mistake of thinking it can or ought to be proved by reason. Can any method be more scholarly and congenial to higher education?

The strength of this position is obvious. Kant rightly pointed out that the traditional arguments for God in the end fell back on the ontological in some form

which simply assumed the identity of thought and being in line with classical thinking.² The evidence however does not support conclusively such an assumption. Therefore rational metaphysics in the traditional sense, especially theological metaphysics, is impossible. At this point the Lund school stands on firm ground. They also maintain correctly that faith selects its religious content from history. Decision among historic faith-judgments is determinative for faith. Practically always however, except in the case of the founders of new religions, the contents of faith are found in concrete historical religions. The Lund school contends convincingly that religions are organic in nature, having concrete centers from which they must be viewed, and that therefore theology in a decisive sense is the description of historic faiths from within their own distinctive and determinative natures.

The faults or shortcomings of this method however are grave. As in the case of Neo-Calvinism, the method cuts all rational relation between the transcendent and the transcendental. The filling of "the category of eternity" by content from history becomes entirely an arbitrary affair. We are once again left with complete religious relativity in the realm of knowledge. The living cord between religion and truth is cut. Consequently higher education is left with a choice for or against a religion that has no rational claim on education and provides no empirical foundation for it.

Then again, although the distinctiveness of faith is valuable for the contextual ordering of knowledge and communication, the distinctiveness of the Christian faith according to the Lund theologians consists in God's revelation of Agape. This is a heavenly reality come into history. But no account is taken of the realms of Eros or Philia (seeking and mutual love respectively), the realms of our actual problems, and no way is opened to account for these realms or to relate the heavenly to the historic. The relation is cut between the realm of redemption and that of creation. The whole aim of the Lund school is to distinguish the Christian faith at its own genuine center from all other religions and human thinking, *not* to relate the faith by providing a context of explanation, judgment, or renewal. Therefore this method does not lend itself naturally to become the framework of meaning for Christian higher education, but it *could* if the aim of the method would become relational, contextual, and renewing.

It should be added, moreover, that the new generation of scholars with Gustaf Wingren as their leader are cutting off the philosophical preamble to Lundensian method.³ Dew-fresh creations, moreover, are still possible from within this movement. It has much to offer contemporary theology, but apart from its radical reconception it is hard to see in it a real hope for a full and organic relation to Christian higher education.

²See Arthur Lovejoy's excellent discussion of this assumption in his *The Great Chain of Being*.

IV

Analytical linguistic philosophy or verificational analysis is not theology! Even so it should be included because of its immense importance for both modern theology and higher education. It has challenged us to a radical rethinking of Christian language, method, and the relation of Christian faith to other subjects in the curriculum. Incidentally it has kept countless good students from entering the ministry or undermined the vigor of their faith. The pre-ministerial students have seen no way around its claims that theological language, if not the whole enterprise, is meaningless.

Nevertheless, we must understand this movement sympathetically. It arose, primarily perhaps, because the special sciences took over all the fields of knowledge. In giving birth to and bringing up these children, philosophy made itself a superannuated mother with nothing to do. Kant's critical philosophy, for these thinkers, furthermore, debarred it from metaphysics; and plain humility (or loss of nerve) kept it from tackling the job of synthesizing all the data from all the sciences. Analytical linguistic philosophy that actually started as logical positivism accepted as its premises that philosophy is empirically uninformative, that it deals with meaning as its sole province, and that meaning is not to be dealt with psychologically as the denotation of particular words as such but logically within propositions. The task of philosophy became the analysis of the meaning of language, for language was its field and analysis its method. Meaningful truth, this position claimed, must be either certain, that is, totally analytical or tautology, or probable in terms of experienced sense data. Verification by sense data became a basic principle, even criterion, of true philosophy. The ideals of mathematics in analysis and of inventory in the realm of experience underlay the whole movement. It is nominalism carried to its full extreme. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*, especially in the first edition, and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* illustrate generally the earlier stage of this point of view.

In the second edition of his book (1946) Ayer has come out for a different kind of verification principle. He now admits a permissible inference from sense experience like the study of the past from manuscripts and all the necessary inferences of modern physics. "Tough" verification has given way to "weak" or "soft" forms of it. Wittgenstein, again, has shifted from verification to "usage" philosophy in his posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). In this view language is not so much a convention to be cleansed by analysis as an organic growth which must be considered for legitimate use. Verification is only one test and kind of usage. The disciplines of analysis and verification in other words have taken on wider contexts.

The appraisal of this point of view in relation to Christian higher education is not easy. It has done us all a service by cutting the ground from under a rationalistic,

² Cf. his *Theology in Conflict*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

objectivistic metaphysics. This method severed reason from faith, truth from life. It has also focussed philosophy on its main task: the study of meaning. But above all it ought to help us to cut down much unfounded and foolish theological speculation. A flabby faith uses much slippery thinking. Most Christian apologetics is too weak-minded and soft-hearted to pass the bar of competent, fair-minded thinking. We should be well and lastingly rid of it.

On the other hand linguistic analysis provided a convenient refuge from the kind of faith that is properly related to reason. Men seek concealment both against and through their own knowledge. They found it in logical positivism and its successors. One way of reasoning God away, for instance, was the following: certainty has to do with logical propositions or with analytical truth only; all existential truth is contingent; therefore the claim that God exists, that a necessary being exists, confounds logical categories and is literally meaningless. Some even tried to prove the non-existence of God by such logic! Philosophical analysis, in the second place, also removed faith from truth, religion from knowledge, and led to the full extreme, the split between the realm of form or thought and fact or experience. This bifurcation is perhaps the gravest cause today of our lack of religious and social leadership in intellectual realms. Christian higher education with its need for synoptic vision and contextual wholeness is therefore definitely threatened by this severing faith from truth and by this depicting of religion as entirely arbitrary and not subject to knowledge and legitimate education.

What can we do about this position with reference to theology and higher education? The answer is partly that it is itself changing and becoming self-critical. Its advocates need only keep on extending the realm of experience to be explained far enough and they will find themselves right in the midst of theological problems and methods! The experience out of which the analysis comes in the first place is contingent! Therefore the all-or-none split between logical certainty and empirical probability is itself impossible for human beings. With that insight collapses the brittle bifurcation *at its heart*. Or we can show that not only can we not experience "the whole," the world, God, or any other such category completely (one of the main contentions against theology on the part of verificational analysis) but no scientific theory is ever experienced completely, like the salinity of the ocean or the law of gravitation. The position has the appeal of the cleanliness of limited data and of a preconceived and confined method, but after its first intoxicated blindness to the fuller problems of truth, it is already beginning to sober up and will doubtless gradually return to the central concerns of the relation of man's meanings to his existential problems. Christian higher educators can learn much from linguistic analysis without being either floored by it as the destroyer of theology or fooled by it as a revolutionary reorientation of man's total knowledge.

V

Liberal theology is presently under a cloud. It should not be "more than others." Its advocates were great in faith and scholarship. Little apology needs to be made for

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

old line Liberals like Rauschenbusch, Clark, Brown, and Brightman or for new line Liberals like Bennett, Calhoun, and Walter Horton. Liberalism is characterized by an openness of spirit that is urgently needed. My former colleagues, Roger Shinn and Langdon Gilkey, have pointed out how dangerous can be the people who pass from Fundamentalism into Neo-orthodoxy without the mellowing influence of Liberalism. Liberalism stands for fairness, for understanding and appreciation of other positions than one's own. Liberals at least profess to believe that we are to learn from others, not only fight them. Liberalism stands also for unity of truth both within and between all levels of it, as for instance between faith and reason and between confession and conduct. Liberalism has also evinced an emulable social concern. Men like Rauschenbusch, Gladden, and the Niebuhrs in their early years illustrate this natural combination between the liberal emphasis on truth, reason, experience, love, and social responsibility. Evangelicals of the middle of the Nineteenth Century evinced both social vision and concern, but the overwhelming credit for the acceptance of the organic relation between Christian faith and social ethics must be given to the Liberals. For them social improvement, especially through education, became second nature. What are more important to higher education than an open spirit, respect for truth, and concern? Christian higher education owes a debt of gratitude beyond estimate to its liberal spirits, even its radically non-theological liberal spirits like Dewey and Meiklejohn.

Liberalism failed, all the same, because of its omissions and mistakes. Idealistic in attitude, the Liberals for the most part never took keenly enough to heart man's actual sinfulness. Therefore they developed a theory of objectivity of knowledge that fails to take into account the fact that, as far as ultimate and personal involvements go, men tend to rationalize rather than to reason, that is, to use reason primarily as a means of self-justification, defense, and attack. "The cult of objectivity," as we now see, was largely an ideal. Men will not readily see the saving truth when it is also the demanding judge. There was also a false continuity of method in Liberalism where the ultimate nature of faith (of there being, for instance, no presuppositionless thinking in ultimate matters, of the selective truth's being more real than the aggregative truth, of decision being often more important to education than information) was not clearly perceived and applied. Nor was there a vivid, positive zeal among most Liberals who were more interested in fighting backwardness and narrowness than in paying the costly price of positive zeal, particularly when this meant resolute opposition to partial and killing causes. Liberals were too willing to please. They lacked an effective principle of exclusion. To oppose, to refuse, to deny, to take the persecution for the commitment to absolute causes — such decisive action seems intolerance to easy-going good will. But at many of these points the Neo-Liberals have changed while also preserving some of the best features of Liberalism. We can hardly be thankful enough for its good points, but educationally we never dare to forget that an absolute demands *decision* for the pursuit of a certain course no matter what. Educationally, too, growth is mostly the persistent following of such a course.

VI

One of the most important theological movements for Christian higher education is Neo-Naturalism. In one form or another this drive in theology is best represented by men like Whitehead, Daniel Day Williams, Wieman, Tillich, and Bultmann. These men accept the best in science and aim for adequacy of thinking through philosophy, acknowledging besides the need for mystery as the penetrating counterpart and the constant companion of knowledge. Whitehead, Wieman, and Williams believe that religious thinking must wait on scientific data and philosophic interpretation for intellectual adequacy. Tillich and Bultmann also insist that religious knowledge must not be pre-scientific. For all of them the organic and relational stress of knowledge is of critical importance. Religion as an evaluative response to reality is part of personal, social, and cosmic experience. The stress of the first three thinkers on the organic nature of reality and of knowledge, on the fact that no subject can find its fullest truth apart from the consideration of its relation to other subjects and to the whole, on the togetherness of reality and of value, and on the synoptic approach in general have made their thought of inestimable importance to higher education while their stress on integrity of knowledge, life, values, truth, and the religious life has resulted in the creation of a very high form of religious thought.

Along with Whitehead, Tillich is at the very front of constructive thinking. His elucidation of the Christian faith, his expounding of philosophy, his grasp of historical thought, his understanding of non-Christian religions, his at-homeness in art and culture generally, his immersion in depth psychology, and his capacity to communicate with even hostile spirits in the secular university sets him apart as a minister to higher education. President Pusey of Harvard has related how completely he won over a group of Harvard professors who came to meet him with pronounced skepticism with regard to his religious position. Tillich is more than a profound thinker, however; he is both a prophet and a systematic pioneer. At a time of confusion or regression in constructive thinking Tillich has forged ahead with both deliberate care and accelerating speed. The center of Tillich's position is the relation between the unconditional and the conditioned. Religious reality is the dimension of the unconditional. God does not exist as a Being among beings, but is the unconditional Reality, nowhere existing as such, yet everywhere available as the power to resist non-being and to make for harmony of being. The central scene for Tillich is history where meaning is translated into concrete experience through freedom. Christ is the center of history as the picture in history of the Unconditional. Thus essence and existence meet in him, not in such a way that the Unconditional becomes conditioned but so that the conditioned becomes completely transparent to the Unconditional by the full acceptance of the right relationship between the Unconditional and the conditioned. The Cross is the symbol and power of this relation; and the Resurrection is the declaration in history of the victory in life of Eternity. Eternal life is the releasing and creative participation in this Reality. Love is the symbol that most fully explains and makes available true power and justice. Protes-

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

tantism is the realistic power for self-criticism and creative renewal. The Church is community in the full, inclusive sense revealed in Jesus as the Christ, but all community whether secular or non-Christian exists and has its reality in the true community of the Church as the representative of the Kingdom of God. The theologian must live and think within the circle of a concrete religion, but he lives also in the total life around him. Therefore he mediates between religious and secular thought. The secular world has enough moral and spiritual sense even to be the conscience of the empirical church which is always tempted by idolatry and self-adulation. Between theology and the secular world, therefore, there can be creative co-operation.

Tillich's theology relates itself exceptionally well by its very nature to higher education. His exposition of the faith is centrally Christian in a descriptive and creative sense. It has a piercing quality of first-hand insight. His faith in the general presence of the *logos* provides us with unitive meaning and synoptic vision without reduction of differences, and yet, even so, all meaning is subject to the infinite mystery of the Unconditioned. Few theologians have fuller or truer appreciation of secular learning and culture than Tillich.⁴

Bultmann represents the existentialist kind of Neo-Naturalism. Ontologically he is basically at one, he claims, with existentialist philosophers like Kamlah, Jaspers, and Heidegger. The real difference between them consists in the fact that, whereas the philosophers believe man can make a free positive decision, Bultmann understands that man must rather accept passively "by grace" the working of God in human life. God is the power available to man in the ultimate mystery of being who through man's acceptance of grace can relieve him of anxiety and give him a free decision for the future. Christ exhibited this reality in the Cross and in the Resurrection. These are not objective events in the sense of bare historic occurrences but are rather meaningful events that can and should be re-enacted in the present in response to the proclamation of the Gospel. Christ saves insofar as we know for ourselves the present reality of the losing and finding of self by the overcoming of anxiety and the reception of faith freely open to the future. Insofar as they are meaningful, past and future are both part of the present tense, of the moment for acceptance. Those who have found this reality of overcoming anxiety by the power not themselves are "in Christ," "in faith"; what counts is the original reality of the experience of Jesus and of His Disciples. They interpreted these experiences, to be sure, in objective supernatural terms of a God beyond this world who literally came to earth and paid for man's sin by the shedding of His own blood and by literally rising from death. Modern man trained in science, Bultmann holds, rejects such primitive thinking, but the *original* rather than the *objective* reality of the New

⁴Surprisingly Karl Barth also has such appreciation, but it does not come as the natural outgrowth of his central theological position.

Testament Gospel remains: "to offer man an understanding of himself which will challenge him to a genuine existential decision."⁶

The Early Church succumbed however to Stoicism and made a world-view out of the Christian faith. This intellectualizing of the faith was a basic mistake. The New Testament speaks genuinely of a Gospel of Christ's death and resurrection as the power of a new kind of life and community "in Christ" or "in faith." *Weltanschauung* is no part of the Gospel. Bultmann's theology therefore has no contextual capacity for higher education; its power rather is to break down static structures of interpretation imposed on experience in the past that hinder the creative activity of the spirit in its constant need to appraise happenings, to decide concerning their significance, and to provide freedom from anxiety and the motivational connection with "the stream" of reality of which Bultmann speaks in his *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*.

What should be said of Neo-Naturalism in its relation to Christian higher education? Already we have stressed its high and significant relevance. We have also emphasized how profoundly and seminally Christian it is on its descriptive side, especially in the case of Williams, Tillich, and Bultmann. Why, then, can we not come to rest in the Neo-Naturalist position? The real problem is created by Christian theology and concerns the nature of transcendence. This term can be found in their writings or else its obvious equivalents. None of these men is a humanist. Saving reality, God, is radically more than human experience or effort. Nor are they reductionistic Naturalists in the sense of employing a limiting scientific method. The closest to such a view of science is Bultmann, but he goes beyond scientific Naturalism in the narrow sense even in his ontology. They all reject unequivocally, however, the supernaturalism of Christian classical theology. God, for none of them, is the supernatural Creator, the self-sufficient Ruler of plants and planets who is other and more than the best we know both in human experience and in cosmic description, the One who from beyond the world became Incarnate in it, who died for man's sin in His full identification with man and who rose victorious over sin, law, and actual death by the deathless power of His supernatural Love. Classical Christianity with its objective supernaturalism can be treated as symbol or myth but never as factual.

Is this shedding of supernaturalism however not a riddance and relief for honest faith and competent education? Does it not remove from the Christian history or as true ontology. Tillich and Bultmann are most emphatic on this point. theology of today its largest false obstacle separating it from higher education? Has not the demythologizing of the Bible been our biggest task for several generations, now at length recognized and effected? Is it not also true that many who confess to belong to other theological tendencies in fact belong here ontologically? Modernity of assumption is more pervasive of the inner man of education than appears on the surface of confession.

⁶Rudolph Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in *Kerygma and Myth* (edited by W. Bartsch), p. 16.

VII

The real problem is not admittedly whether Neo-Naturalism is genuinely biblical or Christian in the historical sense. If it is true, we should all come to it. Radical translation of terms is then justified and we have no right to accuse these men of dishonesty in their use of them. Has not Kant, furthermore, made it impossible ever again to show critically that supernaturalism is true? Kant himself of course is a complex problem at this point, considering the whole history of his writings, and to try to refute him easily is foolish, but the following line of reasoning makes me believe that at its heart classical Christian supernaturalism is not only biblical and historical but actually true. At least I find no equally convincing alternate for faith.

I grant that along the usual lines of thinking Naturalism has a right to say that any thought, experience, or fact, human or cosmic, may be defined as natural. Aside from these facts furthermore we can know nothing. What is revealed, Naturalists say, are only the fuller dimensions of human nature and of the cosmos in which we live. In terms of human experience or thought as such therefore there is no proving of a world beyond this one or of a Being beyond natural beings. Naturalists also have a right to say that trust in unexamined revelation is completely arbitrary and eventuates in intellectual relativism, a choosing of ultimates at will without check or challenge from evidence or reason. Along such lines of procedure Kant of the First Critique remains unanswered; and supernaturalism is mere primitive thinking or at most precritical philosophy.

There are objective facts however that Kant was in no position to consider. We are not left with the choice of either disavowing the cosmological proof entirely or of assuming the ontological along with it. This Kantian cornerstone of modernity is not hewn out of granite of fact nor is it built on marble of reasoning. The facts according to science itself are that we live in a cosmic process that has come to be over unimaginable long ages, by means of new levels of development which, as they become added to previous process, are found not only to fit into it organically but to fulfil it. To believe that such an accumulative series of appearances that have added up to an organic unity of the universe and of the universes has come to be and come together without cause and without reason is to believe in miracle with uncontrolled credulity. When the astounding fact is added that from the point of view of life, personality, and creative community (our relevant data for the criterion of meaningfulness) this process is almost brand new, the abruptness of the process becomes overwhelming. Sir James Jeans has calculated that the time since creation may be compared to Cleopatra's Needle (the obelisk in London); the time of life to a penny on top of it; and the time of civilization to a postage stamp. However many ways there are of approaching or of explaining these facts, they are pivotal for any thinking concerning ultimates. They break all reductionistic Naturalisms except as these are accepted either as ignorant assumptions or as credulous faiths. These facts also forbid all easy assumptions that the description of present process best indicates

the nature of reality. Such a freezing of the process goes contrary to the overwhelming indication of process as on the move, awaiting further development. There are therefore solid facts, indeed, which bridge the gap between the cosmological reasoning and the ontological.

Where, however, does this insight leave us? There is no returning to a rationalistic inductive or deductive reasoning that "proves" God. Kant is right that all reasoning from experience to ultimate reality in the end in some way uses the ontological "proof." Kierkegaard also correctly contended that nothing relative (historical, ethical, or metaphysical) can ever prove God. That the less certain should prove the more certain is obviously logically false. Dorothy Emmet therefore in *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* has well dismissed deductive and hypothetical analogies, retaining only those that are existential and co-ordinating. She dismissed too quickly, however, projective analogies. In case the projective analogies are merely the absolutizing of something in history which is obviously relative, Kant and Kierkegaard stand guard against such projective thinking. When the actual bridge between cosmological and ontological reasoning stands forth strong, however, then project thinking changes its intent, status, and effectiveness.

In such a case the entire problem is altered. To make no deliberate choice of ultimates, if a person is mature enough to make such choice, is to retreat from reality and from responsible intellectual and religious leadership. But *all* thinkers have assumed presuppositions, some stance towards reality, some configuration of experience that indicates what they actually consider to be most important and most real. The right response to reality is consequently to have as true and effective interpretation of ultimate reality and meaning as possible.⁶ All have to live by faith, the only question is by what *kind* of faith they live. William James is right that there are live, forced, and momentous options among which we must actually take our choice. Brand Blanshard in his Presidential Address to the American Theological Society, 1956, made a strong reply to William James, however, to the effect that it is unethical ever to go beyond the facts, to make any leap of faith at all not warranted by the facts, for such choice is actually the confusing or substituting of faith for knowledge. At this point we all have to be utterly scrupulous and critical. No leap into ultimates gives us new knowledge. Such a leap may put us into position to receive new knowledge from beyond present process. After all, new knowledge *has* come into process in the past and we are in no position to deny that new facts do appear or that new insights might throw fuller or different light on ultimate questions. Since no leap gives us knowledge however, we can say no more than that we *must have* some co-ordinating presupposition on presuppositions for thinking, for the total configuration of life, and that therefore we should choose the one that seems least arbitrary.

We are then led back again to our facts concerning the origins of the world we know. Not to acknowledge a creative Ground of cause and reason behind, before, or inexplicably within process which is more than present process and which accounts

⁶This argument is worked out at length in my *Faith and Reason*.

the least arbitrarily for it is to be facing the past by infinite reduction or to be parochially frozen within the present. When our faith stands in whatever best accounts in process for its development, its unity, its meaning, and its fulfilment, it is the least arbitrary. Not that we have therefore cleared up the mystery of the new or of creation! But transcendence⁷ becomes the least arbitrary content of our faith if it can be shown to have organic relations to the other levels and if it can be seen to explain inclusively the meaning of the total process with the richest explanatory adequacy we can find.

Translated into theological terms this means that incarnation and eschatology are primary to thinking. Knowledge of ultimates must be had from within experience and process. God becomes man, enters human experience and process to reveal Himself. It means also that knowledge is eschatological in the sense that incarnation points forward towards the consummation of creation. The redemption of creation by means of incarnation takes place in time directed toward the future. Such theology springs out of our actual knowledge situation. We Christians believe in the Incarnation, that God came in Christ as the fullness of time. In such a case eschatology becomes the fulfilment inclusively of what has come once for all conclusively in Jesus as the Christ. God is the personal Spirit who is holy Love. We do not know Him in His eternal glory, but we do know Him as such Love from within our bounds of time and space. Furthermore it is important for education that the Holy Spirit is biblically defined as the Spirit of Truth. When God came in Jesus Christ as the personal Spirit who is Holy Love, He came as the personal Event that is also the center of meaning. The living Christ then becomes the context, judge, and transformer of all knowledge. If this is correct theology, how does our analysis refer to all the contemporary tendencies we have described and evaluated?

VIII

In the light of our analysis we can see that it is possible to keep the Fundamentalists' emphasis on "evangelical supernaturalism" without their obscurantist literalism of biblical inspiration and of propositional revelation that shuts them off from the open inquiry of higher education. We should also rejoice in the Neo-Calvinist stress on the transcendence of God and on His revelation in events, particularly in the history of salvation and in the Christ, without accepting its pitting of redemption over against creation and event over against meaning. As a protest movement to establish the primacy of the transcendence of God and of His self-revelation in the Word, we have needed this movement, but now it is time to see how transcendence and incarnation are related to God's ubiquity and to His work in creation and history. The Lund school of theology can teach us about the distinctiveness of the Christian faith by means of its dominant and determinative motif, *Agape*, and the need for patience and critical care in the description of what is truly

⁷Obviously, transcendence need not be conceived of *directionally*, only *dimensionally*.


CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Christian, but we need not with them deny to reason its proper place of interpreting and of relating the faith. If we release the full power of the Christian faith, however, we shall in all three of these movements find a classical Christianity which while remaining itself can be related both contextually and motivationally to the needs of Christian higher education.

In the case of the last three movements discussed — Linguistic Analysis, Neo-Liberalism, and Neo-Naturalism — the problem has been a forfeiting of the transcendence or the distinctiveness of the Christian faith. We have seen, however, how it is possible competently and honestly to go beyond the strictures on faith inherited from Kant. We share with the Linguistic Analysts their revulsion to slippery Christian apologetics and covet their drive for cleanliness of thought. We believe too that the day of an objective rationalistic metaphysics as a legitimate approach to ultimate questions is over, but we know that their position is the extreme illustration of a false bifurcation between thought and fact and that fact cannot be tied down to sensationalism. We are therefore hopeful that beyond their function as a cleansing fire, the Analysts will become creatively constructive within the bounds of their genuinely critical insights. The Liberals need to encourage us to openness of spirit, width of view, and the unity of truth both in thought and in life. Their accommodation of spirit makes for co-operative inquiry with those in higher education, but we need not on that account lose decisiveness of truth nor distinctiveness of theological method.

The Naturalists we have already appraised by means of our own constructive analysis. Their lack is an effective method for the understanding and pointing to adequate and effective transcendence. They, above all others, are offering higher education relevant stimuli and contextual suggestions. Whitehead's influence should grow in the field of higher education and there are some indications to this effect. Tillich's *Dynamics of Faith* shows how very much a dynamic and creative religious thinker can offer motivationally as well as intellectually to Christian higher education. Daniel Day Williams is one of the most effective speakers in the Faculty Christian Fellowship. We share with these thinkers their horror for an arbitrary revelationism, unsupported by genuine data and by reasoning from within the processes of our modern educational activities. These processes can be opened up to the truth of classical Christianity precisely by the use of legitimate reasoning about the facts already established by modern educators. We need primary thinkers to do this.

Creative Christian higher education is a high challenge during these days of rapid intellectual and cultural transition. No facile solution will do and no fixed formula will ever satisfy the constantly dynamic enterprise of education. I am convinced, however, that a new age of constructive leadership for civilization can come if we appropriate the universal truth of the Christian revelation in Christ and apply this with both experimental caution and bold creative courage to the ever expanding and deepening problems of higher education. Only such a constructive undertaking can entitle us to use the name Christian higher education.



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The Inarticulate Roots of Free Values

PETER VIERECK

"The trouble with conservative literature," remarked Henry Seidel Canby, "has been that one had to be a liberal in order to write it!" His remark is often quoted to score a point against conservatives. Let us applaud his remark insofar as it gives a healthy jolt to their frequent smug stupor; Mill called conservatives "the stupid party," and conservatives are the first to agree, their stupid inability to theorize in a vacuum being the source both of their weakness and of their strength. But let us partly qualify Mr. Canby's remark insofar as it attacks conservatives not merely for being stupid but for being inarticulate. The pride of conservatives, from Coleridge on, has been that their philosophy is inarticulate, inexpressible,¹ an organic history-rooted growth, not an ideology nor a conscious economic or political program.

It is only fitting that nimble-minded, logical liberals should be the ones who (in Canby's words) "write conservative literature." So doing, they and they alone give conservatism a program, a clearcut ideology. The ideology they give to conservatism has only one little fault: it is incorrect. For it has nothing to do with the real spirit of conservatism. Except for this imperceptible drawback, their clearcut ideologizing of conservatism has all the major "literary virtues": it is what editors call well-organized; it lends itself to being classified in some neat pigeon-hole; it provides the comfortable feeling of presenting to you, black on white, everything Marjorie Jane needs to know about conservatism on her fourteenth birthday, complete with diagrams and glossary. Examples of such articulate conservatives — that is, such liberals of conservatism — are those who advocate conservatism as a program or party. Most of those current tomes will tell you less about the conservative spirit, its strength and its weakness, than these thirteen casual words recently retorted by a Conservative M.P. when chided for imprecision: "If I could define my views with precision, I wouldn't be a Conservative."

Self-respect resists being pigeon-holed. The mania for categories (What is your civil service rank? Are you a sadist or a masochist?) does as little to explain the seamless unity of reality as does that "precise defining of your terms" so dear to semanticists. On the contrary: imprecise necessities — like the words "conservatism," "freedom," "religion" — ought to be used imprecisely. Reality itself is unsymmetrical, ungeometrical, imprecise.

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¹Sometimes it takes conservatives, from Coleridge on, a thousand articulate pages to express how inarticulate, how inexpressible they are.

It may be generalized that the conservative mind does not like to generalize. Conservative theory is anti-theoretical. Cardinal Newman defined Toryism as "loyalty to persons," liberalism as loyalty to abstract slogans. Liberalism argues, conservatism simply is. When conservatism becomes argued, systematized, self-conscious, then — like some French conservatives but no British ones — it resembles the liberalist rationalists it opposes. It then becomes a mere liberalism of conservatism — meaning: a mere doctrinaire theorizing of conservatism. The mentality of liberal rationalism consciously articulates abstract programs; the mentality of conservatism unconsciously embodies concrete traditions. Hence the wise stupidity, stupor, stolidity of the inarticulate conservative temperament. It is a temperament so stupid that it never invented brilliant, irrefutable utopias sending millions to the guillotine; so stupid that it never joined the most advanced reasoners of its age in donning French "Liberty caps" in the 1790's or signing pro-Soviet manifestos of the misnamed League Against War and Fascism in the 1930's.² Because conservatism embodies rather than argues, its most valuable insights are not sustained theoretical works nor well-organized, clearly presented, and geometrically consistent treatises, as in the case of liberal rationalism. Rather its most valuable insights are the quick thrust of epigrams, as in the writings of Metternich, Disraeli, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Churchill, or the nuggets concealed within the disorganized, wonderfully helter-skelter jottings of Coleridge, the most imaginative, most incoherent conservative of them all. To support the above position against that majority of readers who want a "message" organized, consistent, and edifying, let us recall one warning from Yeats, one from Emerson.

Yeats: "Man can embody truth, but he cannot know it." Poetry tends to embody truth, prose to know it. Conservatism tends to embody truth, liberalism to know it. Hence conservatism more often occurs among minds of artistic imagination, liberalism among analytic scientific minds. Because conservatism stresses concrete emotional loyalties more than allegiance to abstract syllogisms, it overlaps more frequently with poetry (that crystalization of the emotional and the concrete) than do any other political isms. The most important conservative minds of nineteenth-century England were also leading poets — Coleridge, Wordsworth, Newman, Arnold — or else at least literary figures of a primarily poetic imagination — Carlyle, Disraeli. A comment similar to Yeats's occurred in Emerson's journal of 1838 (because himself no conservative, note that the liberal Emerson first con-

²Apropos conservatives being too stupid to appreciate the brilliant abstract blueprints of communism, the statistics of the Roper and Gallup polls of 1945 and 1946 about Russia are worth recalling. In both polls the educated American tended to trust Russia's peaceful intentions while the uneducated, the ill-informed, the very poor, were far more skeptical about Russia. The latter groups, to quote Roper's analysis, "inclined to charge Russia with dark and sinister intentions," while the educated classes and "those who knew something about Russia" leaned, on balance, "strongly toward friendly understanding." Whereupon a more sarcastic editor commented in 1952: "to predict accurately in 1945 that Russia would act as Russia has acted, you had to be as dumb and poorly informed as an ox."

THE INARTICULATE ROOTS OF FREE VALUES

sidered as "a defect" what the conservative Yeats considered a strength): "Once I thought it a defect peculiar to me, that I was confounded by interrogatories and when put on my wits for a definition was unable to reply without injuring my own truth; but now, I believe it proper to man to be unable to answer in terms the great problems put by his fellows: it is enough if he can live his own definitions."

The liberal and prosaic rationalist defines his life; the conservative and poetic intuitionist "lives" (in Emerson's phrase) his definition. Both seem necessary; the fact that the liberal rationalist wins any logical, verbalized debate does not make him the more necessary of the two. Leading the right life is not the same as being right in a debate. Defending a free society is not the same as defending syllogisms about freedom.

According to a Burkean definition by the contemporary Chicago scholar, Stanley Pargellis: "The rationalist or the liberal frames his political decisions in accordance with some theory derived from an abstract notion of universal truth; the conservative takes into consideration an extremely wide variety of [concrete] acts . . ." In the light of this distinction, let us contrast a typical British approach and a typical French approach and then contrast their possible consequences on the battlefields of 1940.

The traditionalism of the British expresses both the dreadful inefficiency and the wonderful deep-rootedness of their old winding roads, their old non-decimal weights, measures, coins. These seemingly silly old relics the rationalist is itching to straighten out by introducing the admittedly more efficient French metric system of decimal weights, measures, coins. If the latter could be taken by themselves alone, they would be improvements. But you cannot adopt these quintessences of French rationalism without also adopting the mentality of abstract blueprints that produced them and accompanies them. The metric system, in place of the awkward local traditional systems of measure, was adopted in every country conquered physically or spiritually by the invading armies of the French Revolution; it was not adopted by those awkward, traditionalist islanders who alone held out uncompromisingly from start to finish against revolution. They thereby saved the liberty of Europe, in the 1790's as in 1940.

The word "metric system" is being used here as a shorthand, symbolizing all the other rational but deracinating changes that tend to accompany it, such as reorganizing the old, loyalty-encrusted provinces into impersonal, geometric-shaped departments. This latter sacrifice of biology to mathematics, of history to abstraction was likewise rejected in England, adopted in France. Every culture must choose between a conservative inefficiency that has historic continuity and an efficient rationality that lacks historical continuity. England pays a high price for its choice: the lack of a modern coherent system of weights, measures, coins, departments, roads. But that loss is compensated for many times over by the following gain: in

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

time of crisis, a concrete-minded country stands deep-rooted and firm for its ancient concrete liberties at some glorious Battle of Britain, while an abstract-minded country, blest with efficient metric systems and with new universal Rights of Man, falls rootless in some Battle of France. Who the devil wants to die fighting for a geometric-shaped province?

Such considerations make G. K. Chesterton's "The English Road" not only a delightful poem in its own right but a perfect crystallization of the conservative nature of liberty:

Before the Roman came to Rye or out to Severn strode
The rolling English drunkard made the rolling English road,
A reeling road, a rolling road, that rambles round the shire;
And after him the parson ran, the sexton and the squire. . . .
I know no harm of Buonaparte and plenty of the Squire,
And for to fight the Frenchman I did not much desire;
But I did bash their baggonets because they came arrayed
To straighten out the crooked road an English drunkard made.

Among Slavs, this distinction between traditionalist England and rationalist France repeats itself. Scorned by liberals for their backwardness, but thereby being able to maintain their historic continuity, the inefficient, religious, superstitious, bigoted peasants of Poland battled against Hitler's tyranny more heroically and also more effectively than the efficient, rational, unbogoted, modern-minded tradesmen of Czechoslovakia. You cannot revel too joyfully in the superior logic of your scientific roads and your inorganic geometric institutions without giving up your organic historic continuity; and who gives that up gives up the first foundation of free values. Bigoted old prejudices, stubborn hereditary ignorances may seem the loathsome dung of history to the enlightened progressive, but from that dung the tree of liberty draws its tempest-resisting fortitude. Again and again in history it is not abstract liberals, with fine sentiments and irrefutable syllogisms but the stubborn bigoted traditionalists who risk their necks to stop the Hitlers, the Stalins, and our own little Huey Long's and McCarthy's.

"A virtue to be serviceable," said Samuel Butler, "must, like gold, be allied with some commoner but more durable metal." For "virtue" substitute "civil liberties;" the durable metal, without which the gold of liberty is unserviceable, is the concreteness of irrational ancient custom.

Science and Religion

Which Way Rapprochement?

JOHN D. GARHART

Since the days when John Thomas Scopes was the most famous ex-school-teacher in America the shooting war between science and religion has been much abated. And while the intellectual scene has lost a certain excitement in the process, it probably is just as well that truth no longer has to suffer the slings and arrows of the more wildly outrageous partisans of Moses and Darwin. Unfortunately the shooting war was replaced, not by some fecund association between the erstwhile opponents, but by the withdrawal of both parties into a sort of tolerant neutrality.

Only within the last decade has there been a broad and systematic effort to meet what the Danforth Foundation and the Pennsylvania State University have joined in calling "the need for some real rapprochement between the field of science and the field of religion." In 1953, '54, and '55 these two organizations endeavored to meet this need in the standard pattern of Danforth Seminars. A group of college teachers of science was brought together with leaders from the field of religion and the relations between these two areas were studied. In 1956 this pattern was changed and the professors of religion met to discuss these problems under the guidance of scientists.

The chief and permanent member of this group of guides was Dr. Harold K. Schilling, Professor of Physics and Dean of the Graduate School of the Pennsylvania State University. To his established reputation in science Dr. Schilling has added in recent years a growing reputation as an interpreter of science to theologians and vice versa, through his leadership in groups of this kind.

At the end of this seminar Dr. Luther Harshbarger, Penn State chaplain and chairman of the seminar, asked for our suggestions for the next year. We had barely made a beginning at our topic: "The Natural Sciences: Their Nature and Relation to Religion." Consequently most of us favored a continuation of the study the following summer with the majority of the new group recruited from our own seminar and from the three seminars of science teachers that had preceded it. Our thought was that such a group would have the necessary background to go deeper into the subject and to arrive at some conclusions.

This proposal was put into effect at Penn State on June 16, 1957. Dr. Schilling and Dr. Harshbarger were with us once again. With them, to provide guidance in theological thought, was Dr. John Dillenberger, Professor of Theology at the Har-

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

vard Divinity School. The leadership was splendid and the members of the group were both competent and congenial, but at the end of the session the hope of the previous year's optimists had vanished. We had no significant conclusions. Why?

While they were without doubt valuable educational experiences, the previous seminars had not produced the broad base of common understanding between the two fields that we had expected. In most cases neither the scientist nor the theologian was entirely clear as to what the other thought he was doing or the way in which he proposed to go about doing it. The seminar was to explore "the nature, content, and methodologies of both disciplines and their inter-relationships." But it took us so long to reach a minimal understanding with regard to nature and methods that we had no time for effective exploration of the inter-relationships.

Progress also was delayed while inter-discipline rapport was established. Some of the scientists approached theology with a caution reminiscent of Houdini visiting a seance. And some of the theologians seemed prepared to greet the scientist's effort at theology with amused condescension. Only the development of friendships outside of our formal meetings exorcised the curse of professional parochialism. All in all, it took more than half the time we were together to reach the point at which some of us had fondly imagined we were going to start. The moral of this is that there is a genuine gulf between science and religion as they actually are carried on today; no amount of good will or vague generalization will make it go away.

A second major obstacle to our progress toward conclusions was the unfocused nature of our discussion. Dr. Schilling and Dr. Dillenberger had found it impossible to meet together to co-ordinate their lectures, and their efforts to remedy this through correspondence, while laudable, were not particularly successful. But the difficulty in bringing our thought to some focus stemmed primarily from the diffuse nature of the question with which we were trying to deal. Our concern for a rapprochement between science and religion naturally raised the question of their nature and inter-relation. But unless this sort of question is cut down into bite-size pieces, ten days of discussion is not going to do much with it. The seminar, however, in approaching the problem that confronted it, seemed to aspire to ubiquity.

In addition to revealing these difficulties the seminar also pointed the way to improving the situation. This was particularly true of the problem of developing understanding between the representatives of these two disciplines. The answer is to expose people to science and religion in actual operation. We had the opportunity to see research being carried on last summer at a nuclear reactor and to visit the laboratory of Dr. Erwin Müller, inventor of the ion emission microscope. Seeing science being done at close quarters provided us with a kind of understanding that our talk about science had lacked.

In our discussion it had been asked whether Dr. Müller *really* photographed atoms. But discussing the proper definition of "photograph" and "atom" does not lead to a satisfactory answer to a question of this sort. So we went and watched

what he did and saw his results for ourselves. Then "photographing atoms" became a convenient verbal symbol for our experience and ceased to be part of a proposition for debate. It is through direct contacts of this sort that the methods of science and the nature of its operational definitions become clear to men outside the field.

A similar sort of contact is necessary to understand religion. Here the obvious temptation is to draw analogies between visits to laboratories and the participation of our group in daily worship. But this was not the point at which the scientists had their difficulties. They had been in churches, but they had never been inside theology.

Dr. Dillenberger helped to remedy this almost by accident. One evening he wandered from his subject in search of an illustration and suddenly found himself at grips with the question of the theological necessity of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. Previously he had been presenting us with answers at which he already had arrived. Now we were permitted to see the way in which he had labored to reach those answers. It became clear that for him this problem could not be solved by determining the ancient Hebrew usage of "almah" or by studying the latest laboratory reports on parthenogenesis. What was involved was a total structure of divine revelation in history and the witness of the religious community to which that revelation was committed. The primary concern was not the intellectual respectability of miracles but the religious experience of Christians. To the degree that this approximated an operational definition, Dr. Dillenberger was speaking a language familiar to scientists, and they gained insight into his thought.

In our efforts at rapprochement between these two disciplines we often pass out our conclusions with an almost reckless abandon, while doing very little to clarify our methods of reaching those conclusions. Thus each field tends to expect the wrong things from the other. Theologians are appalled by a lack of epistemological justification for experimental generalizations, and scientists demand in vain the experimental evidence for theological formulations. Simply multiplying discussions of the nature, content, and methodology of these disciplines will not overcome this difficulty. Interested members of each field must be given opportunities to see science and theology actually being done, if not to practice the techniques of both laboratory science and formal logic.

The peculiar quality of Dr. Schilling's leadership in these seminars stems from the fact that he knows both science and religion from the side of practical experience as well as from the side of theory and theology. The rapprochement we seek would be materially advanced if more men in both fields approximated his background of theory and practice in both. With the state of knowledge that exists today this would mean for the theologian that he should gain some first hand experience in the actual practice of laboratory science. In general it is at the point of the experimental method that he is weakest. And the scientist should seek direct understanding of the systematic structure and logical method that belongs to theology, because this seems to be his chief blind spot.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

A solution for the unfocused nature of our discussion of the inter-relationships between these fields cannot be illustrated so easily from the experience of the seminar. However, the recognition of the problem probably supplies the answer. Inter-relationship does not take place in general, but operates at particular points of contact. It is to the investigation of these specific areas that we must direct our attention. Two suggestions will illustrate this co-operative investigation.

The first suggestion is concerned with the importance of the created order within the doctrine of revelation. Do the works of creation actually "declare the glory of God"? And, if so, in what way, to what degree and with what effect? Here we might expect fruit from the collaboration of those who study the details of the created order and those who specialize in the nature of revelation itself.

Another useful discussion might center in the problems of methodology. The effectiveness of operational definitions in the field of science is well known. Historical theology also contains statements that are more nearly operational than logical. For example, a common Biblical description of God is in terms of the events in which He has been active within the history of His people, rather than in the abstract categories of ontology. Therefore, if each of these disciplines is going to make some significant appeal to experience and to the operations and events involved in it, it might be well for them to exchange notes on the methods that they use and the rules by which they test the validity of their conclusions.

The experience of our seminar indicated that such a common methodological enrichment is possible. As a member of the group we had Dr. Terence Penelhum of the University of Edmonton, a representative of those contemporary descendents of logical positivism who denominate themselves simply as analysts. When it became clear that Dr. Penelhum did not share the religious prejudices usually associated with Ayer and Carnap, his comments on the issues under discussion were sought with great interest, since he represented a viewpoint not precisely identified with either science or religion. Both scientists and theologians were impressed by the usefulness of the analytic methods in the examination of our problems. Subsequent gatherings might well include such a catalyst for the discussion.

The seminar ended with a mild sense of regret that we had not accomplished more in the way of specific conclusions. In spite of this, the dominant note at the time of parting was one of hope for the future. We had formed new friendships, gained new perspectives, and carried with us the conviction that seeds had been planted from which something of significance was likely to grow. We didn't arrive, but we offer the record of our travels with the hope that they form a part of the march toward a genuine rapprochement between the fields of science and religion.

Books and Publications

Literary Criticism: A Short History

By William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1957. \$6.95

This book is quite rightly to be regarded as a major work. It moves through the course of western criticism with learning and freshness; it works from pre-suppositions that are supple and flexible, yet without denying or distorting the basic position of the authors. It suggests intricacies of relationship which wear a very different guise from those usually suggested in the guidebooks. And beneath these various specific achievements there stands a wise and often witty harmony of judgment about the discord of critical history.

The job which Mr. Wimsatt and Mr. Brooks set themselves is, of course, uniquely difficult; for they move through the whole European tradition — not pretending to “cover” its detail but attempting (and I think successfully) to do something even less possible. The book is designed to give the sweep and motion of western critical thought and to suggest quite precisely what its major cruxes have been. Of the many aspects of the book which are worth special comment this seems to me the most remarkable — to fuse in one sustained insight the development of critical theory as the relative beginner needs to know it and the modification of that same theory as the advanced scholar needs to be reminded of it. The book has succeeded in making critical history coherent, in short, without making it inflexibly neat and tidy.

The secret of this success may lie in the fact that the most central and familiar issues of criticism are the ones seen most vigorously from a new point of view. The distinction between classical and neoclassical catharsis, for instance, or the concept of poetry as picture, or the interpretation of romantic imagination — in cases such as these the book is uniquely perceiving. The value of such insight, furthermore, goes beyond the individually “new” ideas themselves; it leads us to recognize again the power in a genuinely original perception of time-worn and presumably “settled” problems.

In other words this book is an exemplar of a particularly important way of using the mind — a way followed both in the chapters by Mr. Wimsatt and those by Mr. Brooks.

The intensity of the neoclassic crusade to see that the sinful protagonist suffered the death-penalty — and that no innocent character did — may obscure for us a reactionary but equally simplistic trend of that time toward the luxury of pity for innocence injured. The cases had much in

common, for in either the Aristotelian tension was resolved. And in either the Aristotelian catharsis of undesirably soft emotions (pity and fear) slides conveniently into a new and sentimentalized version of catharsis — such as that which Dryden in the Preface to his *Troilus and Cressida* adapts from Rapiin: not catharsis (or "abatement") of fear and pity, but abatement of such aggressive and evil emotions as pride and anger through the *feeding and watering* of the soft-hearted emotions of fear and pity. Thus the most nearly amenable classic doctrine became, by a sufficient deflection, an authority on the side of the coming ethics of benevolent feeling.

Even in so brief a passage as this we can see the book's characteristic method — an almost oblique summoning up of those facts which should be commonly known (in this case the neoclassic attitude toward dramatized guilt and innocence), but a central emphasis on the meaning of mutation within the continuity of western thought (in this case the radical shift from *catharsis* as a hardening process to *catharsis* as a softening and mollifying process).

To this allusive structure the book owes its remarkable sense of inclusiveness — of range and depth without satiating detail. Mr. Brooks' way of achieving these qualities varies from Mr. Wimsatt's, of course, but they are equally central to his rhetoric.

As an instance of adequate metaphor Tate adduces "Ripeness is all," as spoken by Edgar in *King Lear*. This figure is not imposed upon the experience "as an explanation" of it. Rather

the figure rises from the depths of Gloucester's situation. . . . Possibly *King Lear* would be as good without Edgar's words; but it would be difficult to imagine the play without the passage ending in those words. They are implicit in the total structure, and concrete quality, of the whole experience that we have when we read *King Lear*.

One must be careful in assigning very precise meanings to phrases like "grow out of the material" and "implicit in . . . the whole experience," which are themselves figurative. But surely they seem to discountenance the view that the imagination is merely whimsical. They suggest that the imagination obeys laws implicit in the human psyche. They even seem to demand the assumption that all human experience is finally one.

Here the insight is "progressive" in the sense that each observation suggests a further one. We move in three sentences from a specific critical judgment to a hazarded general theory of personality and knowledge; we move from the outward sign of criticism to its center and source.

These two examples are not isolated; they suggest the tenor of the whole book — its willingness to judge but its lack of dogmatic arrogance, its true learning

modestly employed, its insight. I find it hard to overestimate the value of *Literary Criticism* as an instrument toward the forming of sound literary judgment. It does not pretend to teach "taste" or a method of analysis; it does something far more important. Implied in the history of western literary thought are the permanent critical questions. History for Wimsatt and Brooks becomes the instrument of that permanence, the revelation of enduring critical significance through change, distortion and partiality of the last twenty-five hundred years.

DOUGLAS KNIGHT

Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays

By Northrop Frye. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. 383 pages, \$6.00

Someone has recently remarked that criticism is at the moment the most cluttered and untidy of all the intellectual disciplines. The fact that ours has been an age of intense and often fruitful critical activity has made confusion inevitable. The more casual reader may be forgiven for sometimes thinking that the noises he hears emanating from the worksite of the house of criticism are actually incident to the building of a tower of Babel.

The attempts to tidy up the scene began some time ago. The standard work that orders and relates the various modes of literary study was (and, in your reviewers's opinion, remains) *Theory of Literature* by Rene Wellek and Austin Warren. But Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism* is a most ambitious and indeed a most impressive attempt at a synthesis of the various literary disciplines. Frye has read, one is inclined to say, just about everything, including the comparative religionists, Freud, Jung and the other depth psychologists, the anthropologists, philosophers like Cassirer and Langer and the other experts on symbolism, all the critics, and, what is very much to the purpose here, everybody who has contributed to Anglo-American literature from Beowulf to James Joyce.

The encyclopedic character of the book does not, however, make it solemn and portentous. It is lively, ingenious, and frequently very daringly argued. But since *Anatomy of Criticism* aspires to sketch out a complete system of literary scholarship, one has to expect the highly elaborate system of classification that goes with such a total scholarship. The four "essays" that constitute the book have to do with historical, ethical, archetypal, and rhetorical criticism. But to cite these titles is only to hint at the complexity of organization. For the four essays induct us into the theory of "modes," "symbols," "methods," "genres," and — to take only one of these — the theory of the symbol involves "Literal and Descriptive Phases: Symbol as Motif and as Sign"; "Formal Phase: Symbol as Image"; "Mythical Phase:

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Symbol as Archetype"; and "Anagogic Phase: Symbol as Monad." Thus, as the term "anagogic" suggests, Dante's four kinds of poetic meaning join Aristotle's six aspects of tragedy (plot, character, thought, melody, diction, and spectacle), not to mention clusters of other terms developed from the time of Aristotle to that of Empson, in order to provide the elaborate terminology required to deal with the great manifold of notions which Frye sets before us.

Frye's tidying-up process does not mean to leave us with a room empty, swept, and garnished save for the furniture that he himself has put into it. On the contrary all the present furnishings are to be retained but neatly arranged in proper order. Frye aims at a "synoptic view of the scope, theory, principles, and techniques of literary criticism." He does not mean to attack any "methods of criticism." What his book does attack is "the barriers between the methods. These barriers tend to make a critic confine himself to a single method of criticism, which is unnecessary, and they tend to make him establish his primary contacts, not with other critics, but with subjects outside criticism."

As the last phrase indicates, Frye is zealous to preserve the autonomy of "criticism" (that is, the general study of literature) and yet to vindicate such study as a civilizing force and one which will even help us build a society of a special kind, "free, classless, and urbane." Whether his *Anatomy of Criticism* actually escapes the embarrassments of every other scheme which would make literature autonomous and yet at the same time fruitful for the human enterprise, I am not so sure. Those of us who emphasize the autonomy of literature usually end by being charged with asserting an irresponsible aestheticism. Frye's present effort seems to me to run the opposite risk of setting up the study of literature as a kind of substitute for religion, though Frye, to be sure, makes his disclaimers on this head.

The place that the "new criticism" is made to assume in Frye's scheme will throw some light on his aims and methods. Frye would prefer to call this variety of criticism "rhetorical criticism." I am not altogether happy about the substituted term but it certainly represents an improvement on the vague and misleading adjective "new." At any rate, since this kind of criticism has had its prominence in our time, Frye adverts to it again and again.

Some of his comments represent acute and perceptive judgments: "The critics who tell us that the basis of poetic expression is irony, or a pattern of words that turns away from obvious . . . meaning, are much closer to the facts of literary experience . . ." (p. 81), "Thus the metaphor turns its back on ordinary descriptive meaning, and presents a structure which literally is ironic and paradoxical" (p. 123); but in other passages he seems to acquiesce in the view that "rhetorical criticism" is preoccupied with mere detail and has no concern for the larger structures (p. 140). At any rate Frye would add to what he regards as its characteristic lyric focus, a concern for plot and action; to its focus on the literary artifact, a concern for history and biography; and to its stress upon the unique work, a concern for

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

literary conventions and genres. If a person of my critical sympathies has been inclined to take this kind of filling out and completion for granted, there is, it must be admitted, something to be said for spelling it out. And if one means by "criticism," as Frye does, the total concern for the literary process, then much which one has subsumed under the varieties of scholarship must be fitted into an "Anatomy" of criticism. (With regard to the general relation of "new" or rhetorical criticism to genre theory, it will be interesting to the reader to turn back to what Wellek and Warren said on the subject some ten years ago in their *Theory of Literature*.)

Frye's ambition is to develop criticism in the direction of a science, a kind of "social science," and in accord with this view, he consistently plays down value judgments as incorrigibly subjective and really unnecessary. He is surely right in distinguishing between the history of taste and criticism proper. He is right again in pointing out how frequently our prejudices and ethical judgments dominate our value judgments in literature. But ought criticism to "show a steady advance toward indiscriminating catholicity"? If the study of literature is developed toward a social science, can it ever become a "value-free" social science, and if so, is it desirable that it should become such? I could wish that Frye had developed this point more fully and more clearly. He does write that "the critic will find so, and constantly, that Milton is a more rewarding and suggestive poet to work with than Blackmore." But substitute other names, and the issue is not so clear. And if the issue in this instance is clear, could one not ground the judgment in something objective? Frye uses the obvious superiority of Milton to Blackmore to suggest that one won't want to waste time "in belaboring the point." Blackmore is certainly a very small lion and one that is much too dead for one to waste bullets on. But there is plenty of live game: there are discriminations to be made and presumably worth making. A criticism that finds it beneath its purposes to "criticize" has moved far toward a neutral and "scientific" scholarship.

Though Frye has insisted that he merely wishes to relate *all* the various kinds of criticism to each other, it is his treatment of archetypal criticism that gives the special character to his book. Certainly it is of archetypal imagery that he writes with most zest and brilliance, and in his general ordering of the various disciplines archetypal criticism is assigned a very special role. Indeed, Frye gives first importance to archetypal criticism in the task of breaking down the barriers that separate the various kinds of criticism.

The subtitle of his section on archetypal criticism is called "Theory of Myths." Frye finds that there are four narrative categories: the romantic, the tragic, the comic, and the ironic or satiric. These he associates with the four seasons of the year. Romance, for example, is the mythos of summer. In romance there is something of the wish fulfillment dream — there is a persistent nostalgia for some kind of golden age. The complete form of the romance is the successful quest. In the completed quest can be discerned three main stages: the perilous journey, the crucial struggle,

and the exaltation of the hero. The hero of romance is analogous to the mythical messiah who comes from a divine world; his enemy is analogous to a demonic power. The enemy is associated with winter, darkness, and moribund life; the hero with spring, dawn, and fertility. The heroes of romance include such figures as St. George and Perseus and Moses and Beowulf. Frye writes that the four *mythoi* (comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony) may now be seen as four aspects of a central unifying myth. It is, of course, the myth of the year god.

The quest romance had analogies with the rituals as characteristically examined by Frazer and the dreams analyzed by Jung. "Translated into dream terms the quest-romance is the search of the libido . . . for a fulfillment that will deliver it from the anxieties of reality but will still contain that reality.

Thus far, however, we have done no more than hint at something of the amplitude and complexity of Frye's speculations on this rich topic. To go a bit further: romance, Frye insists, has six isolatable phases: the first three are parallel to the first three phases of tragedy, and the second three to the second three phases of comedy. (These are flanking *mythoi*, since comedy is the *mythos* of spring and tragedy the *mythos* of autumn.) I can do little more than indicate what the six phases are, with only one or two instances of the many examples that Frye cites. The first phase is the myth of the birth of the hero. (Compare the birth of Beowulf or Moses.) The second phase brings us to the innocent youth of the hero. (Compare Johnson's *Rasselas*.) The third phase is the normal quest theme already discussed. The fourth phase is the maintaining of the integrity of the innocent world against the assault of experience. (Compare Milton's *Comus*.) The fifth phase gives a reflective idyllic view of experience from above. (Compare Hawthorne's *Blithedale Romance*.) The sixth phase marks the end of a movement from active to contemplative adventure. (Compare Yeats' "The Tower.")

How complex Frye's complete scheme is becomes plain when we remember that the *mythoi* of the full four seasons will yield some twenty-four phases. But Frye's resourcefulness is equal to the demands put upon it. He is bright, perceptive, nearly always plausible, and quite frequently convincing as he manipulates these sub-categories. Indeed Frye resembles nothing so much as the scientist filling out Mendelyev's table, predicting from the vacant place in the table the properties of the element to be discovered and assigning a descriptive name to it. For example, in his theory of genres, one can find Frye saying, "Our next step is evidently to discover a fourth form of fiction [he has already treated the novel, the romance, and the "confession"] which is extroverted and intellectual." This turns out to be the "Menippean satire," striking examples of which are to be found in *Alice in Wonderland* or *The Water-Babies*. Indeed one of the most useful things about Frye's book is that he does devise or refabricate new genres that the literary critic is indeed in need of. Moreover by establishing so many intermediate points between his various genres (and various myths, for that matter) Frye does much to take


BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

the curse off of the rigidities of genre criticism. The demarcations between the classes become not much more than useful points of orientation, the family groupings often prove illuminating, and the shadings can be made so minute as to allow one to deal with the actual contours of the work in question.

What such criticism as this ultimately comes to, it seems to me, is a classification of the various kinds of literary "materials" — of the various possible narrative sequences, patterns of action, themes, psychological clusterings, etc. Long before Sir James Frazer and Freud and Jung, men had noticed the resemblances between the myths of the gods and the basic plot situations and the general patterns through which the human mind functions — and even made some attempts to relate them to literary types. (A striking anticipation of Frye's combined classifications occurs in the seventeenth century with Thomas Hobbes' combining three levels of "matter," court, town, country, with two modes of presentation, dramatic and narrative, to produce six genres.) To say this, of course, is not to belittle the truly great achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in cultural anthropology, comparative religion, the theory of symbolism, and depth psychology. Our age has learned enormously in these fields. That we can ever learn enough to do without a criticism that makes evaluative judgment, I doubt very much. The ultimate difficulty of archetypal criticism is that it cannot tell us the difference between a good work and a bad, since an inferior novel, for example, may on occasion make use of the richest archetypal material and yet remain an inferior piece of art. This is the point that Jung has already made: *Moby Dick* is a great novel and Rider Haggard's *She* is not, but they both incorporate archetypal material. Indeed, what literary work does not? In so far as Frye has really classified all the possibilities of narrative structure, all the varieties of the hero, all the symbolic progressions, it will be impossible for any fictional product of the human mind not to find its proper pigeon-hole.

But to enter these reservations does not alter the fact that *Anatomy of Criticism* is indeed a remarkable book. The author's incidental critical judgments, it ought to be stressed, are frequently brilliant. He is not merely a system builder but a critic of real power. But he is certainly a most resourceful system builder. And the system itself, considered simply as an intellectual feat — a critical *tour de force* — is astonishing. One predicts that *Anatomy of Criticism* will have an emphatic impact upon our literary studies, and, for good or ill, will exert a continued influence.

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VISIT YOUR BOOKSTORE SOON

Abingdon Press

Emotion and Meaning in Music

By Leonard B. Meyer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 307 pages, \$5.75.

Of the few authors in recent times who have had the courage and patience to tackle the subject suggested by this title, Mr. Meyer is one of the most successful in delineating the problem. Although the author's treatment of the topic is incomplete as he readily admits, and is also uneven as we shall attempt to explain, his is a painstaking and systematic attempt to penetrate a dark and confused area that succeeds in many ways where others have been vague and unsatisfactory or have failed altogether.

Attention should be called at the outset to the fact that the title itself is misleading because it leads one to expect too much, certainly more than would be humanly possible within the limits of a book of such modest size. This is one reason why the book fails to live up to the expectation aroused by its title. Part of this disappointment may be due to the temptation to misread the title, for which the author cannot be blamed, but there is an implication that he is attempting to explain the meaning *of* music as well as meaning *in* music. The author evidently chose his title deliberately with this in mind but there is a strong undertone in the book of a desire to deal with both aspects of the problem and they are not the same. This ambiguity is indicative of the dilemma in which the author finds himself and from which he does not entirely escape.

The most valid criticism of the title is suggested by the author himself and begins by stating clearly and forthrightly what ground he intends to cover and what he does not intend to cover.

There is also a sense in which the title and, in fact, the whole book suggests and accomplishes more than perhaps the author intends in that it puts at our disposal new tools and sharpens old ones that are needed in working toward a more meaningful design for the patterns of life and culture in a world threatened by futility and meaninglessness.

There are many valuable insights scattered throughout the book and the first chapter on *theory* is the most significant since it provides the basis for the author's subsequent exposition as well as indicating ways in which music is related to the whole of human culture. The first chapter is solid stuff and takes some doing to digest its varied and rich content; in fact, unless one makes a serious attempt to assimilate the ideas contained in the first chapter, the rest of the book loses much of its meaning and effectiveness.

Mr. Meyer begins by stating what he intends to do and this deserves close attention: he states this succinctly on pages three to five. In lieu of quoting these pages in full we shall attempt a digest of his analysis of the traditional approaches to

his topic. First, there is the "absolutist" position, based upon the assumption that musical meaning is confined to the context of the musical work itself. Then there is the "referentialist" position based upon the assumption that musical meaning comes through reference to the extra-musical world of concepts, actions, emotions and character. Mr. Meyer goes on to say these are not mutually exclusive, but his emphasis will be on the former. He would like to treat both points of view but admits that this would take another volume if he were to deal with both points of view adequately.

In addition to the "absolutist" and "referentialist" positions there are also those of the "formalist" and the "expressionist," and these he attempts to clarify. The "absolutist" position is not identical with the "formalist" nor is the "referentialist" position the same as the "expressionist." The "formalist" assumes that musical meaning is primarily intellectual: the "expressionist" assumes that musical meaning is also emotional. The author adopts the combined position of "formalist" and "absolute expressionist." In adopting this position he recognizes the difficulty of the "absolute expressionist" point of view and asks how one can account for the processes by which perceived sound patterns are experienced as feelings and emotions and recognizes the difficulty of dealing with the emotional response to music. Part of this difficulty, he says, comes from our lack of information about response to stimulus, particularly in the realm of the arts, and especially in music. We have the testimony of composers, performers, conductors, critics and audience but we know almost nothing about the nature of the response to the musical stimulus and its effect upon the listener.

Our most serious lack, according to Meyer, is a theory of emotion as related to the arts, as an integral part of aesthetic theory. His thesis about the role of emotion in aesthetic response is that emotion is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited, but that this theory does not tell us what an emotion is. Further, we are led to believe that much emotional behavior is undifferentiated since it is basically not a natural but an acquired response through social conditioning and the desire to share and communicate common experiences or to conform, and all these factors are interrelated. The author goes on to say that in the particular theory of emotions which he adopts there are no pleasant and unpleasant emotional experiences since the pleasantness of an emotion seems to lie not so much in the fact of resolved tension as in the belief that a resolution is forthcoming. The resolution of tension in a pleasant emotional experience is due also to our ability and desire to share and communicate this experience.

This theory of emotions is related to musical experience in that emotion is aroused when an expectation or tendency to respond, activated by a musical stimulus, is temporarily inhibited or permanently blocked.

Mr. Meyer faces a more serious difficulty in attempting to establish an equally satisfactory theory of "meaning" in music, since, as he maintains, "meaning" must

have the same signification in all realms of experience and he immediately rejects two common fallacies, first, the tendency to locate meaning exclusively in only one aspect of the communicative process and, second, the tendency to regard all meaning as involving symbolism of some sort. This casual reference to symbolism is disappointing since it leaves one in doubt as to the author's real attitude toward the place of symbolism in his theory of meaning. He does not discuss the implications of these two fallacies but proceeds immediately to the definition of "meaning" which he proposes as the basis for his work. This theory is that "anything acquires meaning if it is connected with, or indicates, or refers to something beyond itself, so that its full nature points to and is revealed in that connection": thus "meaning" is the product of the relationship between the stimulus and the thing it points to or indicates.

The issue is confused by the author's attitude toward "designative" meaning and "embodied" meaning with his admitted preference for the latter as a tool in explaining meaning in music. He says (p. 35) that since "most of the meanings which arise in human communication are of the designative type, employing linguistic signs or the iconic signs of the plastic arts, numerous critics have failed to realize that this is not necessarily or exclusively the case. This mistake has led even avowed absolutists to allow designation to slip in through the secret door of semantic chicanery." This statement seems to obscure the author's position rather than clarify it.

Mr. Meyer's rather thin treatment of the theory of meaning is a serious weakness, especially in view of his more adequate treatment of the theory of emotion. This weakness is understandable but disappointing since it is the meaning "in" and "of" music that is of vital importance.

The most intriguing aspect of the book, since it is admittedly philosophical in its approach, is in the uncertainty of the author's starting point and objective. The whole tone of the book is "scientific" but it leaves one with a sense that music is what it is and we are free to choose our own interpretation of meaning and emotion in music. Our freedom of choice is still our inalienable right and it is good to have a new affirmation of this right supported by clear, logical thinking. And yet it is important to try to discover the author's premise about the nature of his subject and his attitude toward it not so much in what he says explicitly as in what is implied. He begins by reflecting hedonism, atomism, and universalism as well as other forms of philosophical monism in solving the problem of aesthetics. There are hints of determinism and positivism in the course of the author's development of his main thesis but there is an unmistakable strain of a stronger and more vital approach that reflects existentialist thinking more compatible with current needs. The author's impatience with separation of emotion from intellect and his recognition of the function of tension and paradox in aesthetic theory, as well as the

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

place of social conditioning and the function of faith and belief is a happy relief from an easy acceptance of more mechanistic and evolutionary theories of culture.

In spite of the author's implied bias in favor of existentialist thinking he is caught in the trap of abstraction made necessary by the treatment of music as an isolated phenomenon and by the attempt to treat problems of emotion and meaning from a "scientific" point of view. One example of this ambiguity is the author's criticism of Cassirer which is worth quoting in full. Meyer quotes Cassirer as follows (p. 18): "Art gives us the motions of the human soul in all their depth and variety. But the form, the measure and rhythm, of these motions is not comparable to any single state of emotion. What we feel in art is not a simple or single emotional quality. It is the dynamic process of life itself." Meyer, criticising this statement, says (Chapter L, fn. 20, p. 274): "This admirable statement like so many of its kind suffers at the end from an irritating vagueness in which an intangible 'the dynamic process of life itself' is substituted for a definite account of how and why the emotions of art are not comparable to any single state of emotion. It is for a solution to this problem that we are searching in the present discussion of emotional differentiation."

Meyer's criticism of Cassirer is indicative of the book's most serious weakness, in fact the weakness of all attempts to explain emotion and meaning as a part of aesthetic experience on a purely humanistic or rational basis, because this approach assumes the art product as an accomplished fact and avoids the prior and more important question of the origin of the creative act itself, and the impulse or stimulus that brought the art product into being in the first place, and it treats too lightly the materials out of which the art product was created and the creative powers that gave it content, form, shape, and vitality.

Even though the author acknowledges the limited scope of his treatment there is one final criticism that needs to be made and that is his indifference to the role of the active participant. This attitude is reflective of an aesthetic point of view that is becoming more typical in our culture, particularly in professional music circles, that music is something that exists in the abstract apart from life as an object of speculation rather than a living, breathing organism inseparable from flesh and blood that conceived it and produced it and from which its emotion and meaning is derived.

LOWELL P. BEVERIDGE

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Dr. Lowell P. Beveridge is Professor of Speech and Music at the Virginia Theological Seminary.

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Dr. Douglas M. Knight is President of Lawrence College and formerly a member of the Editorial Board of *The Christian Scholar*.

Reports and Notices

Vocation of the Christian College

The second quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges will be held at Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa, June 22-26, 1958, on the above theme. It is planned as a step beyond the first, held in 1954 on the theme, "What is a Christian College?" It is a response by the Commission on Higher Education of the NCC to the expressed desire on the part of member churches and their colleges for an opportunity to further clarify an understanding of and commitment to the colleges' distinctive character as Christian institutions of higher learning.

Discussions of the main theme will deal with: The Theological Foundations of the Christian College; The Relation of Church and Campus; The Responsible Christian Intellectual Community; The Responsibility of the Christian College for Personal and Social Values; The Christian College and the World Mission of the Church; The Student in the Christian College; and other addresses and special presentations.

Each college is urged to send a delegation representing the administration and trustees, faculty, students, and campus Christian workers.

General Assembly of USCC

The United Student Christian Council will hold its fifteenth general assembly at North Central College, Naperville, Illinois, September 5-11. It will bring together the official delegates from USCC's member movements and agencies for a week long conference of Bible study and ecumenical confrontation. The agenda includes study of the role of the Christian student movements in the changing American university, the socio-political task of the Christian student, and the ecumenical reformation and renewal of the Church. Extended attention will be given to the Life and Mission of the Church Program of the

World's Student Christian Federation and USCC's participation therein.

Sociology Section of FCF

One of the basic working groups of the Faculty Christian Fellowship composed of sociologists from several universities met in New York City, April 12-13, to continue work toward its basic purpose: "to undertake a thorough critical examination of basic sociological theory in light of the Christian faith." This will be the fourth meeting of this group during the past eighteen months. They would like to contact all Christians teaching sociology and allied fields in American universities and colleges. Chairman is Dr. Arnold S. Nash, University of North Carolina; other members are Howard Becker, Dwight Culver, Allan Eister, William Kolb, and Allan Stroup.

The FCF also has working groups in the fields of History, Philosophy, Physics, and Theology.

Political Questions

A conference on International Political Questions will be held September 2-5 by the United Student Christian Council. It will provide opportunity for American and foreign students to engage each other in study and conversation on the burning international political questions of the nuclear-space age.

International Journal

A special issue on Christian higher education was published, February 1958, by the *International Journal of Religious Education*, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.

The aim of nine comprehensive articles and a selected bibliography is to help pastors, directors of Christian education, Church school teachers, youth leaders, and parents understand the problems involved in the relation of higher learning and Christian Faith, so that they can give guidance to young people.

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Directory of Fellowships in the Arts and Sciences. Edited by L. Virginia Bosch. This is the preliminary edition of an annual publication intended to provide the student and his advisers with information on the financial support available for graduate study. Published by the Association of American Colleges. Sold by University of Wisconsin Extension Division, Madison 6, Wisconsin

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American Uncial Type

JOSEPH C. GRAVES

The type used on the cover of *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR* is the American Uncial design by Victor Hammer.

Practically all type faces presently in use are derived from hand-written letters of scribes active at the time of the invention of printing and for a century thereafter. Punch-cutters or craftsmen in the printing shops of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries took for their models contemporary script.

During the early history of printing there were type faces reserved for a legal or a religious usage. The Black Letter or Gothic type is an example. With the passing of time this practice fell into disuse. Today, ecclesiastics, lawyers, and the world of commerce share the same printing types.

For over a quarter of a century, Victor Hammer has been experimenting with the creation of a type for the communication of religious, philosophical, and poetical writings. He has followed the procedure of the early printing masters, copying the stately uncials and half uncials of the spiritually rich Medieval period of the Lindisfarne Gospels and the Book of Kells. About 1932, he undertook the rigorously exacting craft of punch-cutting: the engraving of letters in relief upon short rods of steel. Today, Hammer is the only printing craftsman in the United States who cuts type punches by hand in the tradition of the old masters.

During his residence in Italy, France, Austria, and the United States, he has sought to create a type with the even, cursive quality of uncial letters. Work on the American Uncial was completed in the nineteen forties. While this type has been used in books of a poetical and philosophical nature and is widely recognized by European and American typographers, this is the first time it has been used on the covers of a religious publication.

Mr. Joseph C. Graves, who designed the layout and supervised the work of hand-lettering and type-setting for the cover of this journal, is a merchant in Lexington, Kentucky. His great interest in the graphic arts has prompted him to collect many prints in the graphic arts and to give his time, avocationally, to teach in this field at Transylvania College and to lecture at the University of Kentucky and the University of Virginia. He has developed and operates the Gravesend Press for his own and his friends' pleasure.

Second Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges

June 22-26, 1958
Drake University

Theme: *The Vocation of the Christian College*

This Convocation is planned as a second step to the Denison 1954 Convocation which dealt with the theme, "What is a Christian College?" It is a response by the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches to the expressed desire on the part of member churches and their colleges for an opportunity to further clarify an understanding of and commitment to the colleges' distinctive character as Christian institutions of higher learning. It is hoped that from the Convocation will come a document that will give some guidance to the churches and their colleges as to the unique vocation of the Christian colleges in these critical times. In preparation for the section meetings representative committees are preparing documents that will delineate the issues and raise the significant questions on the following subjects:

Section I. *The Theological Foundations of the Christian College*
Chairman: J. Edward Dirks, Yale University Divinity School

Section II. *The Relation of Church and Campus*
Chairman: Alexander Miller, Stanford University

Section III. *The Responsible Christian Intellectual Community*
Chairman: Howard Kee, Drew University

Section IV. *The Responsibility of the Christian College for the Student's Sense of Vocation*
Chairman: Howard R. Bowen, Grinnell College

Section V. *The Christian College and the World Mission of the Church*
Chairman: David Stowe, American Board of Commissioners

Section VI. *The Student in the Christian College*
Chairman: Bruce Rigdon, Wooster College

In addition to the workshops, there will be major addresses, panel discussions and presentations on such themes as:

The Christian College Today—Situation, Dilemma, Call

The Christian College in the Life of the Church

The Christian College and American Higher Education

A Fresh Look at the Vocation for the Christian College

Student Values and Perspectives—The Contemporary Search for Meaning

Evangelism and the College Campus

Major speakers include Kathleen Bliss, Franklin Clark Fry, Hilda Neathy, Jerald Brauer, George H. Williams.

Invited to share in the Convocation are the Christian Colleges of the United States and Canada with the expectation of representation from Christian Colleges in the Far East, Near East, and Africa. Each college is urged to send a delegation representing the Administration and Trustees, the Faculty, Students, and Campus Christian Workers.

For further information write to Cecil W. Lower
Commission on Higher Education, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York